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Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The 
Problems and Promise of Bargaining 
in Land Use Planning Conflicts 
Erin Ryant 
"Dealing'' [in land use conflicts] has a number of potential 
benefits. It allows for individualized decisions that take into ac-
count the unique features of a particular parcel or project and 
the availability of measures capable of mitigating adverse land 
use effects. A carefully tailored set of land use requirements 
based on a bargaining process may be fairer than traditional 
regulation: rather than simply treating roughly similar land 
equally, it takes into account specific characteristics and 
problems that justify variations from a potentially overbroad 
norm. Furthermore, the bargaining process may be more effi-
cient because it facilitates cost-efficient outcomes and substi-
tutes a potentially cheaper decision-making process that fosters 
prompt and amicable compromises while avoiding the costs at-
tendant to protracted administrative and judicial appeals. 
Yet dealing is not without its perils. Unfair or inefficient 
outcomes may result from imbalances in power or skill that ei-
ther distort the dealings of participating parties or result in fail-
ures to consider the interests of affected nonparticipants. In 
extreme cases involving government parties, power imbalance 
may result in the creation of "naked preferences," that is, the 
treatment of one group or person different from another solely 
because of a raw exercise of political power in the absence of a 
broader and more general justification or public value. 1 
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l. INTRODUCTION 
Municipal land use bargaining may imply as many problems as 
it heralds promise, but it is widely acknowledged as the universal 
language of land use planning. Planners and scholars agree that 
public-private negotiation plays a central role in the vast majority of 
local land use decision-making.2 
At least in part, this is a result of the peculiar attributes of the 
resource at issue. Land is, perhaps, the ultimate nonfungible. Land-
forms and land values are forever in flux-at the mercy of both natu-
ral cycles that erode and accrete and economic changes that render a 
given parcel more or less valuable in relation to external factors. 
Each parcel of land possesses unique characteristics not only in its 
physical attributes, but also by virtue of its location, and its proxim-
ity to other unique parcels. Unlike almost every other thing of value, 
it is impossible to relocate spatially. Rules of general application fit 
poorly to so variegated and unstable a resource. 
Moreover, land uses implicate the conflicting strands of property 
rights far more profoundly than do uses of personalty, since free dis-
position of one's own land extends perilously into the realm of neigh-
bors' quiet enjoyment of their own. Although private rights in 
property ownership are a foundational value of our legal system, pri-
vate rights in land use are considerably more constrained. County 
and municipal governments designate the outer limits within which 
landowners may freely exploit their property without unduly burden-
ing the surrounding community.3 Zoning, by which a community 
segregates incompatible land uses, is the primary mechanism.4 
The continuing contest of public and private interests in land use 
is, without exaggeration, epic. Police power-based zoning ordinances 
exist to protect public health and welfare, while takings limitations 
exist to protect property owners from government abuse. 5 But in the 
clash of these competing values lies the classic opportunity for negoti-
ation to resolve disputes, and even to create unexpected value in cre-
atively tailored outcomes.6 Public and private parties to land use 
2. See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning 
Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L. REv. 161, 164 (1989). 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 43-49. 
4. Nicolas M. Kublicki, Land Use By, For, and Of the People: Problems with the 
Application of Initiatives and Referenda to the Zoning Process, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 99, 
106 (1991) ("Zoning is the process whereby municipalities minimize the incompatibili-
ties between different land uses.") 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 14-18. 
6. See generally RoBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO 
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000). 
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disputes have been drawn to the bargaining model in the time-
honored search for mutually agreeable solutions based on beneficial 
exchange. And in the absence of substantive agreement on where 
private must yield to public interests (and vice versa), negotiated 
decisionmaking also provides a deliberative means of pursuing just 
ends. 
Nevertheless, constitutive rules are needed to mark the outer 
boundaries of permissible bargaining to avoid outcomes overly solici-
tous of either public or private interests. The doctrines of reserved 
powers and unconstitutional conditions provide important con-
straints against state abuses, curbing government abdication of pub-
lic responsibilities and exploitation of private individuals, 
respectively.7 The Supreme Court has entered the fray by establish-
ing additional constraints through its takings jurisprudence. Con-
cerned that planning practices had leaned too far in favor of public 
interests in land use, the Court has used several recent takings cases 
to voice protections for landowners in disputes with local govern-
ment.8 However, these new rules make value-creating negotiation9 
nearly impossible in land use conflicts, a result that arguably leaves 
all parties "worse off' than before. 
This article explores the phenomenon of negotiation-based deci-
sionmaking in local land use conflicts and questions the value of con-
straints created by the Supreme Court's new takings jurisprudence. 
Ultimately, it proposes a return to a bargain-based environment ac-
cording to a mediation model, in which abuses are constrained 
through procedural attention to the meaningful representation of all 
interests at the negotiating table. 
Part II reviews the general practice of land use planning and 
analyzes the land use dispute as a site of contest between public and 
private interests. Part III explores how the bargain-based model has 
assumed prominence among local land planning agencies seeking the 
uncertain equipoise between public and private interests. Part IV 
discusses the response of the Supreme Court via its takings jurispru-
dence, and Part V reviews evidence of the actual impact of the tak-
ings decisions on local planning practice. Part VI analyzes the 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 88-92. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 111-28. 
9. In value-creating negotiation, parties explore their broad interests and craft a 
resolution around trades that optimize the benefits yielded to all. This enables them 
to "expand the pie" of contested value before dividing it among the disputants. See 
generally MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 6. 
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problematic anti-bargaining implications of the new takings deci-
sions, and Part VII recommends a return to bargain-based models, 
constrained by a theory of representation that would counter the re-
served powers critique of municipal bargaining. 
II. THE CoNCOMITANT NATURE OF PuBLIC AND 
PRIVATE INTERESTS IN LAND UsE 
The fundamental conflict that drives takings, zoning, and indeed 
most land management disputes is the perpetual tension between 
public and private interests in land use. This tension has been recog-
nized at common law since the time of the Justinian Code,10 and con-
stitutionally since ratification of the Bill of Rights. 11 While private 
ownership of real property is a bedrock principle in the liberal tradi-
tion, 12 a frequently overlooked but critical distinction exists between 
land ownership and land use: though the former is accepted to be an 
inherently private phenomenon, the latter is not. This is demon-
strated by the subjugation of private land use to the sovereignty of 
the public police power, from which has evolved modern regional 
planning and zoning. 
Land Use and the Police Power. Municipal13 land use disputes 
arise in light of the vexing intersection between constitutionally pro-
tected private property rights in land and constitutionally designated 
responsibilities for land use management by the state. Whereas the 
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution makes clear that "private 
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion,"14 the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all powers not 
explicitly delegated to the national government.15 These include the 
traditional "police power" of the state to legislate for the protection of 
10. See Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the 
Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
477, 478 (2001) (discussing the jus publicum of ancient Rome, which protected public 
rights of access to navigable waterways regardless of ownership). 
11. The Fifth and Tenth Amendments contemplate both public and private inter-
ests in land use. See infra text accompanying notes 14-16. 
12. See JoHN LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GoVERNMENT 21-28 (1690) (Macpher-
son, ed. 1980). 
13. Local govemments involved in land use disputes include county, city, town, 
and village govemments. For simplicity, I use the word "municipal" to refer to all 
local govemments below the state level. 
14. U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
15. U.S. CoNST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.") 
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the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare,16 which has 
long been invoked in the resolution of land use disputes. 17 In 1876, 
the Supreme Court affirmed that although the state may not control 
rights that are exclusively private, it may require "each citizen to so 
conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to 
injure another,"18 signifying the paradoxical nature of property own-
ership as a private right that necessarily implicates public 
responsibilities. 
Today, local governments vigorously wield the police power to 
protect various public interests in land use. Regional planning 
designates the limits within which landowners may freely exploit 
their property without unduly burdening their surrounding commu-
nity. But given the contest between public and private interests at 
issue in land use, private property rights in land have never been 
absolute. Common law private and public nuisance doctrines have 
recognized state-enforceable limitations on private property rights 
where their exercise would produce harmful externalities. 19 Private 
parties have also used covenants and equitable servitudes to enforce 
land use restrictions on particular parcels.20 
Even before the rise of twentieth century zoning laws, many mu-
nicipalities adopted local building and land use restrictions to protect 
public welfare and preempt incompatible uses. As early as 1838, 
Michigan law authorized municipalities to "assign certain places for 
the exercising of any trade or employment offensive to the inhabi-
tants,"21 and Boston imposed separate building height limitations in 
16. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 390 (1926) 
(discussing the traditional scope of the state's police power and establishing the con-
stitutionality of zoning as incidental thereto). The police power, though originating in 
common law, is explicitly conferred by most state constitutions as well. DANIEL POL· 
LAK, HAVE THE U.S. SuPREME CouRT's 5TH AMENDMENT TAKINGS DECISIONS CHANGED 
LAND UsE PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA? 3 (California Research Bureau, CRB-00-004) 
(2000) (discussing the origins of the police power in California). 
17. See, e.g., Village of Euclid, supra note 16, at 387 (invoking the police power as 
a legitimate means of settling land use disputes). Highlighting the peculiarly public 
nature of land use disputes, a duet of judges has observed that "[s]ettlement of land 
use controversies, unlike most private disputes, may have a substantial impact on 
nearby properties and the general welfare of the public at large." Hon. Richard S. 
Cohen, Hon. Douglas K. Wolfson & Kathleen Meehan DalCortivo, Settling Land Use 
Litigation While Protecting the Public Interest: Whose Lawsuit is This Anyway?, 23 
SETON HALL L. REv. 844, 844 (1993). 
18. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876). 
19. See RoBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SciENCE, 
AND POLICY 87-88 (3d ed. 2000). 
20. Kublicki, supra note 4, at 107. 
21. Mich. Rev. Stat. 171 (1838), cited in RoBERT C. ELLICKSON & VIcKI L. BEEN, 
LAND UsE CoNTROLs: CASEs AND MATERIALS 87 (2d ed. 2000). 
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residential and commercial areas to minimize fire hazards. 22 State 
courts routinely enforced local ordinances barring noxious uses in 
protected neighborhoods, including the slaughter of cattle,23 the 
maintenance of commercial laundries, 24 and the selling of alcohol. 25 
In 1899, Washington, D.C. restricted building heights to preserve the 
prominence of the U.S. Capitol's dome.26 
The Rise of Regional Planning. The precursor to modern zoning 
first appeared in Europe in 1891 when the German city of Frankfurt 
implemented a comprehensive plan that divided the city into differ-
ent districts with varying building and use restrictions tailored to in-
tended area uses.27 Los Angeles followed in 1909 with a city plan 
that designated one residential and seven industrial districts. 28 In 
1916, the rapid rise of American zoning was triggered by New York 
City's adoption of an ordinance designed to curb the increasing traffic 
congestion and decreasing light and air associated with proliferating 
skyscrapers, and to limit the incursion of sweatshop factories into the 
posh Fifth Avenue commercial district.29 The successful implementa-
tion of the New York plan helped inspire promulgation of the Stan-
dard State Zoning Enabling Act30 by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce in 1922, which provided a statutory model by which states 
might delegate zoning authority to local governments. 
In 1926, in the landmark Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 31 
case, the Supreme Court formally recognized municipal zoning regu-
lations as constitutionally incident to the police power when enacted 
pursuant to validly implemented land use plans that advance a legiti-
mate public interest.32 Zoning spread rapidly to municipalities both 
large and small, most of which followed the Euclid model of strict 
22. Id. 
23. See, e.g., Cronin v. New York, 82 N.Y. 318, 323 (1880). 
24. In re Hang Kie, 10 P. 327, 328 (Cal. 1886). 
25. Shea v. City of Muncie, 46 N.E. 138 (Ind. 1897). 
26. ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 87. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 86-88. Notably, the ordinance was lobbied past city-wide apathy by 
three separate interest groups: Fifth Avenue merchants concerned with avoiding in-
come losses associated with erosion of neighborhood glamour, real estate owners con-
cerned with depression of property values near skyscrapers, and "reformers 
interested in broader concepts of city planning." Id at 88. 
30. U.S. Department of Commerce, Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1926), 
reprinted in ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, ANDERSON's AMERICAN LAw OF ZoNING, vol. 5 (4th 
ed. 1997). 
31. 272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
32. Id. at 387, 390, 395-96. 
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segregation between residential and commercial uses.33 (It has been 
noted, however, that the mass-production of the Euclid model arose 
not because of an inherent superiority, but rather because the model 
had withstood constitutional scrutiny by the Supreme Court.34) In 
the 1950s, the federal government encouraged regional planning 
through urban-renewal grants to municipalities implementing "work-
able programs for community improvement," often signified by 
comprehensive zoning plans.35 In 1991, the federal government con-
ditioned certain federal transportation funding on metropolitan-wide 
transportation planning.36 
Presently, all fifty states have enacted laws that enable (and 
many that require37) municipalities to regulate land use via compre-
hensive plans designed to yield benefits considered otherwise unas-
certainable in light of cost externalization and collective action 
problems.38 Houston, Texas is currently the only major U.S. city that 
does not regulate land use by zoning.39 
As zoning assumed status as the dominant form ofland use plan-
ning by localities, the public interest in private land use was recog-
nized more explicitly. As one scholar has noted: 
Zoning splits property rights between the individual landowners 
and the local government by vesting a set of collective property 
rights in the community. These collective property rights allow 
the community some degree of control over the landowner's use 
ofher own land. While traditional notions of nuisance grant the 
community some power to limit land use, zoning shifts certain 
additional property rights from the landowner to the commu-
nity. Thus, under current zoning law, the community's interest 
in maintaining a particular atmosphere or growth pattern is 
protected by a property rule. A landowner cannot simply choose 
to violate a land use regulation and pay for the damage caused, 
33. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 375 (observing that most jurisdic-
tions hewed closely to the predominant model of zoning following Euclid, yielding "re-
markably consistent, and boring, 'cookie-cutter' development pattern[s].~'). 
34. See CHARLES DoNAHUE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION (3d ed. 1993). Increasing advo-
cacy for mixed-use development plans suggests that the Euclid model of strict segre-
gation may not be inherently superior after all. 
35. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 61. 
36. 23 U.S.C.A. §134 (2001) (codifying a section of the Intermodal Surface Trans-
portation Efficiency Act of 1991). 
37. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 67-68. 
38. See, e.g., ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 41, 59. 
39. Jane E. Larson, Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & PoL'Y 
REv. 137, 147 n.44 (2002). 
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as she could under a liability rule, but instead must obtain per-
mission from the community before proceeding with any non-
conforming use. As long as the land use regulation furthers a 
legitimate government interest, the community can refuse to 
grant this permission.40 
Even as takings jurisprudence reveals a shift in the judicially recog-
nized balance between private and public interests in land use, courts 
have not questioned their essentially bicameral nature, and zoning 
has received general acceptance as a useful tool for protecting public 
interests. However, some critics question whether these benefits 
truly accrue to the community at large, arguing that zoning seeks 
primarily to protect property values and generally furthers the inter-
ests of powerful members of society at the expense of those with 
less.41 
The Mechanisms of Zoning. Ideally, the public interest in land 
use is effectively channeled through the zoning process, which deline-
ates collective land use choices and affords property holders bounda-
ries within which to freely exercise private interests. Zoning operates 
primarily by segregati!lg conflicting uses within a jurisdiction among 
designated districts. 42 The process involves a regulatory two-step: 
promulgation of a comprehensive plan and the pursuant issuance of 
local zoning ordinances. 
Generally, a county or municipality first formulates the compre-
hensive plan,43 which articulates a general rationale and specifies 
benefits the locality seeks to enable through planning. Common 
objectives include the encouragement of appropriate statewide land 
use; the provision of adequate air, light and open space; the control of 
population densities; and the provision of a variety of land uses in 
order to meet the needs of all citizens.44 The comprehensive plan 
may be compared to a set of community blueprints, designating the 
specific-use districts into which all jurisdictional territories are to be 
divided. 
40. Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Re-
visited, 86 IowA L. REv. 1, 16-17 (2000). 
41. See, e.g., John F. MacDonald, Houston Remains Unzoned, 71 LAND EcoN. 
137, 140 (1995) (suggesting that "the demand for zoning arises from its use as a device 
for excluding lower-income people from certain areas"). 
42. Cordes, supra note 2, at 164; Kublicki, supra note 4, at 106 ("Zoning is the 
process whereby municipalities minimize the incompatibilities between different land 
uses."). 
43. The comprehensive plan is sometimes referred to as the "general plan." 
44. Cohen et al., supra note 17, at 846. 
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Local zoning ordinances are then crafted to implement the de-
tails of the plan within the specified districts.45 In a zoned locality, 
each parcel of land is governed by the applicable zoning ordinance, 
which may dictate restrictions relating to permissible uses (i.e., com-
mercial, light industrial, heavy industrial, single-family residential, 
multi-unit residential, etc.), building height, density, architectural 
style, rent control statutes, open space preservation, environmental 
protections, or any other regulations that would permissibly advance 
the goals of the comprehensive plan.46 To withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, a zoning regulation must yield a legitimate public benefit 
without unduly burdening any individual citizen,47 and its enact-
ment must afford due process to directly affected parties.48 
Zoning ordinances often require that landowners seek permis-
sion from the zoning authority to ensure that any significant changes 
are consistent with the comprehensive plan. Thus, a landowner may 
require a subdivision approval before dividing a given parcel for de-
velopment, or a building permit before initiating new construction. 
Also, the zoning model anticipates the need to provide greater flexi-
bility within the confines of the comprehensive plan after its adop-
tion. Mechanisms for adjustment include the issuance of variances 
and special use permits, allowing straightforward exceptions to the 
zoning ordinance; conditional use permits, allowing exceptions on 
condition of the applicant's performance of remedial obligations; and 
exactions, which require that developers provide or finance some pub-
lic amenity in exchange for receiving a use permission that the gov-
ernment could otherwise withhold.49 According to these requests for 
rezoning, the zoning authority might seek alteration of the ordinance 
to allow the proposed use. 
The Special Case of Regulatory Exactions. Exactions, by which a 
municipality conditions a permit for a land use that would compro-
mise some public good on the developer's agreement to provide an 
45. See Kublicki, supra note 4, at 106. For a general exposition of the zoning 
process, see, for example, Kublicki, supra note 4, at 106-14. 
46. See, e.g., PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 4. 
47. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185 (1928) (holding that legiti-
mate zoning regulations must bear a substantial relation to the public welfare and 
not overly burden any individual citizen). 
48. Cf Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) 
(requiring the balancing of legitimate state interests against individual due process 
rights). 
49. See, e.g., PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 4 (discussing the basic tools of zoning); 
Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitu-
tional Conditions Doctrine, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 473,474 (1991) (discussing exactions in 
particular). 
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offsetting public benefit, represent the most significant bargaining 
mechanism in the local land use planning arena. Professor Vicki 
Been explains that "exactions are an outgrowth of the centuries-old 
practice of levying 'special assessments' upon real property to pay for 
public improvements, such as paved streets, that provide a direct and 
special benefit to the property."50 Special assessments were gener-
ally levied after the improvements were installed, but after wide-
spread assessment delinquency during the Great Depression left 
many municipalities unable to recoup the costs of public infrastruc-
ture, mechanisms were sought to shift the initial costs of public im-
provements (and the correlating risk of failure) to private 
developers.51 Communities initially required construction of on-site 
dedications of land for public streets and utilities, but gradually 
sought dedications for public schools, police and fire stations, and 
park space. 52 When lands within a subdivision were poorly suited for 
the public needs generated by the development, municipalities began 
to seek off-site dedications, or fees-in-lieu-of-dedication if the devel-
oper preferred to contribute funds toward public goods rather than 
providing them outright.53 
Ultimately, communities sought to internalize the costs of devel-
opment by imposing impact fees, which assess developers for the costs 
of municipal services generated, and linkage requirements, a hybrid 
of impact fees and off-site dedications. As described by Professor 
Been, 
Linkage programs condition approval of certain central city de-
velopments (usually commercial or office space) upon the devel-
oper's provision of facilities or services for which the 
development will create a need, or that development will dis-
place. These programs have been adopted in a variety of cities 
for such needs as low-income housing, mass-transit facilities, 
day-care services, and job-training and employment 
opportunities. 54 
Set-asides and inclusionary zoning are species of linkage programs 
that address the need for low-income housing generated by new de-
velopment by requiring a developer to make a certain percentage of 
development units affordable to low- or moderate-income residents 
(or to pay in-lieu-of fees to an affordable housing fund). 55 
50. Been, supra note 49, at 479. 
51. ld. 
52. ld. at 480. 
53. ld. at 480. 
54. Id. at 480-81. 
55. ld. at 481. 
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Some observers view the exaction mechanisms as creative means 
of mitigating the negative externalities associated with uncontrolled 
development, 56 but others view them as illegitimate government 
overreaching. 57 These scholars fear that unconstrained municipal 
discretion to trade building entitlements for desired goods represents 
a betrayal of the fundamental purposes and effectiveness of regional 
planning.58 Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that certain 
instances of such bargaining may constitute illegal extortion. 59 
Nonetheless, the varieties and complexities of exaction devices 
demonstrate the sophistication with which municipal planners have 
learned to approach the problem of appropriately allocating the costs 
and benefits associated with development between the private and 
public parties of interest. 
III. BARGAINING AS A RESPONSE TO THE ELUSIVE 
PuBLIC-PRIVATE BALANCE 
Despite acknowledgement of the concomitant public and private 
interests in land use, the confounding problem of trying to reach the 
appropriate balance between them represents the essential struggle 
of the land use planning project. Seeking this elusive equipoise, local 
planning agencies nationwide have adopted practices that enable 
them to weigh the application of formalized rules against the unique 
circumstances of each proposed land use. Some scholars view this as 
a backwards devolution from organized planning to ad hoc case-by-
case adjudication.60 Others view it as the most fair and efficient re-
sponse to a project that defies rigid rule-application due to the uni-
queness of land parcels, proposed uses, and municipal development 
56. Id. at 482. 
57. Cf. Fennell, supra note 40, at 26 ("the fact that a community is willing to sell 
the right to violate a given regulation provides a strong indication that the regulation 
does not constitute a true exercise of the police power"). 
58. See Jerold Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Com-
ments on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoN-
TEMP. L. 3, 7, 47 (1991) (arguing that exaction bargaining unconstrained by nexus and 
proportionality serve to undermine and delegitimize the zoning enterprise); Jonathan 
M. Davidson et al., "Where's Dolan?": Exaction Law in 1998, 30 URB. LAw. 683, 693 
(1998) ("Such a waivable policy induces skepticism about the reality of the suggested 
public purposes supposedly being advanced by the ordinance."). 
59. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994) (noting that the absence of 
nexus in the context of a regulatory exaction "converted a valid regulation of use into 
an out-and-out plan of extortion"). 
60. See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 17. 
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priorities.61 In any event, most agree that today, the raw material of 
most land use planning is the process of negotiation. 62 
Fortuitously, the choice of a bargaining model, even if rendered 
unintentionally, represents a highly rational strategy for pursuing 
the public good under conditions of substantive uncertainty about its 
content. As Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow has observed, "[a]s 
many social and political theorists have abandoned any hope of 
agreeing in advance on the common good, procedural ideals of issue 
by issue deliberation and negotiation have supplanted substantive 
conceptions of the common good."63 In the absence of a surer sense of 
where to strike the public-private balance, the negotiating table of-
fers a route to-if not the correct answer-at least a workable local 
consensus. 
Zoning as Dealmaking. Early zoning theory anticipated that 
land use decisions would primarily occur through the initial alloca-
tion of uses by the comprehensive plan and implementing ordinances, 
with only minor adjustments over time afforded by variances. 64 
However, nearly a century of zoning experience indicates a very dif-
ferent practice. Planning professionals agree that despite the overall 
boundaries established by a regional plan, zoning plans exist in per-
petual flux. 65 As Professor Robert Ellickson notes, 
[b]y around 1980, virtually all planning professionals had come 
to realize the limits of rationality and the unpredictability of 
modern civilization. They thus developed something of a con-
sensus that plans should concentrate on influencing short-term 
and middle-term events. This meant that the planning period 
should not stretch beyond 25 years (at the very most), and that 
any detailed planning should concentrate on what would unfold 
during the next five years or so. Most planners also came to 
believe that plans should be continually revised to take account 
of new information and events. In sum, flexible, middle-range 
planning has come to replace long-range, end-state planning.66 
61. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 40, at 4. 
62. See, e.g., id. at 26-27; Cordes, supra note 2, at 166-67; Carol M. Rose, Plan-
ning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. 
L. REv. 837, 849 (1983). 
63. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyers' Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy 9 
(forthcoming). 
64. Cordes, supra note 2, at 166. 
65. Cf ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 61. 
66. !d. 
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The significant result ofthis constant flow of new municipal priorities 
and development opportunities is that the actual practice of land use 
decisionmaking has grown increasingly discretionary. 
Indeed, current practices demonstrate that land use decision-
making has shifted significantly from the planned toward the partic-
ularized, affording a more ad hoc response to individual development 
proposals. Professor Mark Cordes has observed: 
It is now widely recognized that current zoning practice little 
resembles [the early] notion of planned development, but in-
stead places an emphasis on flexibility and change though the 
use of variances, special use permits, and rezoning. In particu-
lar, these devices are often used to delay concrete decisions as a 
response to an actual development proposal. For example, mu-
nicipalities often subject numerous uses within a particular dis-
trict to the special-use process, frequently providing only very 
generalized standards for issuance of a permit. This in effect 
provides municipalities with significant flexibility and discre-
tion in responding to particular proposals .... Under this ap-
proach rezoning decisions are basically used to make 
particularized decisions regarding the suitability of a proposed 
use and thus in effect administer land development on a case-
by-case basis.67 
Like Ellickson, Cordes posits that this shift from planned to particu-
larized decisionmaking in local land use matters is 
partially attributable to the inadequacies of traditional plan-
ning theory in a fluid society. Static end-state zoning is neces-
sarily speculative in nature and thus at best can only 
approximate possible development needs and patterns. By in 
effect delaying determinations of actual uses until concrete pro-
posals are made, municipalities can assess the potential impact 
of uses in a concrete situation. Moreover ... delayed and flexi-
ble decisionmaking also provides municipalities with significant 
leverage over potential development in order to obtain developer 
concessions. 68 
As Cordes describes, case-by-case land use decisions often occur in a 
"dealmaking" context, in which land is rezoned in exchange for con-
cessions by the landowner. The problem this poses for courts, hear-
gues, is how to properly control the ad hoc decisionmaking that has 
come to characterize the zoning process. 6 9 
67. Cordes, supra note 2, at 166-67. 
68. !d. at 167. 
69. !d. 
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Many commentators have recognized the explicit dealmaking en-
vironment of land use allocation decisionmaking, 70 and practitioners 
presume it as the norm. 71 One scholarly assessment of local practice 
observes, 
Local governments exhibit a marked talent for evading close ex-
amination of the conformity of their regulations to preexisting 
plans. A venerable avoidance technique is vagueness; if the lo-
cal government adopts a sufficiently vague plan, any land use 
ordinance arguably conforms. In addition, local governments 
have continued to develop new devices to retain "flexibility." All 
of these put the locality into the desirable position of being able 
to bargain ad hoc with individual developers. Variances and 
conditional use permits-greatly expanded since SZEA days-
are also traditional; and in more recent years we have seen 
more elaborate devices such as "floating zones," "planned unit 
developments," and "development rights transfers," all of which 
tacitly admit that a locality has no fixed plan for appropriate 
development, but instead wants to deal with individual projects 
as they arise. 72 
For some, the heavy reliance on bargaining practices promises 
outcomes better tailored to the specific needs of the parties and more 
closely approaching the Pareto frontier of efficiency.73 For example, 
Professor Lee Anne Fennell argues that bargaining over land use al-
locations is essential because zoning ordinances rarely provide the 
most efficient initial allocation of entitlements between a landowner 
70. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 40, at 26-27 (recognizing the bargaining envi-
ronment generated by the modern zoning model); Terry Lewis et al., Spot Zoning, 
Contract Zoning, and Conditional Zoning, 2 FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND UsE 
LAw, chapter 9, § IV(E) (The Florida Bar FL-CLES-7-1, 1994) (noting that the key to 
implementing efficient development proposals "is negotiation between a government 
and the developer."); Rose, supra note 62, at 849 (discussing use of bargaining in land 
use development proposals); Wegner, supra note 1, at 958 (discussing the problems of 
municipal land use bargaining). 
71. Anecdotal evidence suggests that negotiation between developers and munic-
ipal planning staffs represents an important component of the early process of decid-
ing permits and variances. See, e.g., interview with Damon Y. Smith, former planning 
staff for the City of Cincinnati, in Brookline, MA (March 9, 2001); interview with Jer-
old S. Kayden, Professor of Land Use Planning at the Harvard Graduate School of 
Design, in Cambridge, MA (April 10, 2001); oral communication with Lawrence E. 
Susskind, Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning at MIT, in Cambridge, 
MA (April 6, 2001). Nevertheless, recent Supreme Court takings jurisprudence has 
effectively muted some of the bargaining that formerly occurred in local planning of-
fices. See, e.g., telephone interview with Liz Newton, Assistant to the City Manager 
for the City of Tigard, OR (home to the famous Dolan v. City of Tigard case, 512 U.S. 
374 (1994)), (March 28, 2001). 
72. Rose, supra note 62, at 879-80. 
73. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 40, at 20-21. 
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and the community.74 This is inevitable, since zoning ordinances are 
promulgated based on the subjective views of a political majority 
about the desirability of various land uses: 
If the initial allocation of property rights were set at the social 
optimum (taking into account the preferences of everyone in the 
relevant community, including the individual landowner), land 
use bargains would be wholly unnecessary; there would be no 
mutually advantageous trades available. Where the initial allo-
cation diverges from the optimum, Pareto improvements can be 
achieved through bargaining .... [I]ndividual landowners 
would wish to purchase relevant portions of the collective prop-
erty rights created through zoning whenever they stand to gain 
more from the exchange than the community stands to lose. 
Under such conditions, the land use "winner" can compensate 
the "losers" and still come out ahead. The need for such transac-
tions is palpable, because the initial allocation of collective prop-
erty rights under zoning is not generated by market forces and 
often bears little relationship to the actual and evolving de-
mands of the population. Because information about true pref-
erences is unavailable, even the most public-minded regulatory 
body would be unable to determine the optimum initial alloca-
tion of property rights.75 
To Fennell, the problem with the modern zoning model is not that it 
deviates too far from the uniform planning model, but that it erects 
too many obstacles to the free-market movement of entitlements be-
tween municipalities and landowners. As zoning generates "a desire 
for land use transactions without allowing those transactions to occur 
freely," Fennell argues that the modern land use planning project 
represents a fundamentally unstable arrangement. 76 
Nevertheless, those who allege that the modern zoning model en-
ables too much bargaining have proved more vociferous over the 
years. As decisionmaking appears more and more ad hoc, interested 
parties validly worry that their interests will not be fairly repre-
sented at the decisionmaking table. Generalized rules are presumed 
to be preferable because they guarantee fairness in the disposition of 
like cases, and the more particularized the decisionmaking process, 
the harder it is for judicial review to assure that fairness has been 
done. The trade-off is poignant: the more particularized the decision, 
the more likely it is to produce optimal results in the individual 
74. Id. Her efficiency calculation assumes that the community does not internal-
ize the costs and benefits experienced by the individual landowner. 
75. Id. at 21-25. 
76. Id. at 26. 
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case-but the more difficult it becomes to ensure state behavior that 
conforms to constitutionally accepted norms of civic responsibility 
and equal protection. 
Concerns of this sort ultimately led to the judicial repudiation of 
certain bargain-based zoning practices. 
Critiquing the Dealmaking: the Rejection of Spot and Contract 
Zoning. Zoning law's basic constraint against the improper public 
usurpation of private interests in land use allocation is that the zon-
ing ordinance is applied equally to all landowners. Accordingly, stan-
dard zoning enabling acts require that zoning ordinances apply 
uniformly to all property within a district, in accord with the compre-
hensive plan, and that ordinances may be invalidated if they exceed 
their scope of authority or are promulgated according to defective 
procedures.77 Critics argue that bargaining between municipalities 
and landowners can trigger one or both of these prohibitions, yielding 
presumptively invalid "spot" or "contract" zoning. 
Spot zoning, the oldest recognized form of zoning corruption, in-
volves the "singling out [of] a small parcel of land for a use classifica-
tion totally different from that of the surrounding area, for the 
benefit of the owner of such property and to the detriment of other 
owners."78 As noted by the Alaska Supreme Court, "[s]pot zoning is 
the very antithesis of planned zoning."79 Historically, spot zoning 
concerns centered on municipal favoritism (or bribery), but the tech-
nique also represents a viable form of targeted persecution. Identi-
fied instances of spot zoning are always presumptively invalid, but 
the cited rationale varies with the jurisdiction. Some courts view the 
rule against spot zoning as rooted in the substantive due process re-
quirement that government action be rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest; others understand it as a check on 
discrimination, rooted in equal protection principles.80 Still others 
view the defect as stemming from the fact that spot zoning does not 
serve any of the permissible purposes for which the zoning power 
may be exercised.s1 
More troubling for advocates of municipal bargaining is the judi-
cial rejection of "contract zoning," a roughly self-descriptive practice. 
77. Lewis et al., supra note 70, at ch. 9 §l(C)(2), at 9-3. 
78. Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Alaska 1996) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
79. Id at 1020. 
80. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 358. 
81. Id. 
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Contract zoning involves a deal that creates an impermissible reci-
procity of obligation between a private interest and a government en-
tity.82 It has been variously defined as the "required exercise of the 
zoning power pursuant to an express bilateral contract between the 
property owner and the zoning authority" and as "the lack of a valid 
basis independent of the contract on which to justify the zoning 
amendment."83 Hostility toward the practice is grounded in the pub-
lic policy concern that government not "barter away or delegate to a 
private entity [its] responsibility to exercise the police power to pro-
mote the public health safety, and welfare."84 
The problem with a deal arising under contract zoning is that it 
would bind the government to specific terms that may ultimately pre-
vent it from carrying out its public duties, while conferring on private 
parties the special status found impermissible in spot zoning. In 
Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Madison Township,8 5 a New Jersey dis-
trict court judge expressed the limits of a zoning board's power to 
negotiate settlements of zoning disputes in these terms: 
We would be permitting special rules to be established for plain-
tiff as against all other developers. We would be allowing these 
parties to circumvent our state laws and the township's own or-
dinances and regulations by not having to apply for tentative 
approval; giving of statutory notice to interested persons; hold-
ing of public hearings; filing of preliminary and final sketches; 
making of uniform regulations; by-passing the Planning board's 
hearings and recommendations; and destroying the township's 
overall or master plan for the development of the township.86 
Contract zoning has been variously rejected as glorified spot zoning 
and for contravening the general zoning procedural requirements of 
notice and hearing. 87 
The primary objection to contract zoning arises under the re-
served powers doctrine, which serves to protect the public interest 
against co-option lest municipal government succumb to capture by 
private interests. The Supreme Court first promulgated the reserved 
powers doctrine in the 1880 case of Stone v. Mississippi,88 holding 
82. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CoNTROL LAw §894 
(1975). 
83. Lewis et al., supra note 70, at § III(A). 
84. Id. at § III(C). 
85. 172 A.2d 40 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1961), affd 189 A.2d 226 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1963). 
86. Id at 46. 
87. Lewis et al., supra note 70, at § III(B). 
88. 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1880) (finding no contract violation when the legislative 
grant of a twenty-five year charter to operate a statewide lottery was subsequently 
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that the state legislature lacked power to cede its police power be-
cause to do so would exceed its authority from the people, and that 
notwithstanding compromises possible of other government powers, 
prerogatives associated with the police power always must be ob-
served. Professor Judith Welch Wegner observes that 
the coalescence of certain factors [in the case law] suggests an 
incompatible blending of contract and police powers that may 
give a court grounds for invalidating a resulting relationship: 
the absence of reasonable clear governmental authority, margi-
nal or unwarranted private expectations, and a strong, circum-
stance- and time-dependent public interest that has been 
effected adversely.89 
Under the reserved powers doctrine, the government may not "con-
tract away" its police power, but "must retain the right to modify reg-
ulatory requirements as needed to respond to important public 
health and safety concerns. It may not waive that right in return for 
private concessions, at least where not explicitly authorized by stat-
ute and where private expectations to the contrary are unfounded or 
ill-defined."90 
The reserved powers problem represents a cogent critique that 
cuts to the very legitimacy of government. In order to justify the 
enormous powers entrusted to government to vindicate public inter-
ests (at the expense of private sovereignty) in land uses, zoning prac-
tice must be tailored to preserve the legitimate and effective exercise 
of the police power. 
From the opposite corner arises the critique that municipalities 
should be prevented from conducting such bargaining under the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine, which prevents trades between an 
individual and the government that implicate a constitutional protec-
tion afforded the individual. Where the reserved powers doctrine is 
concerned with impermissible abdication of government respon-
sibilities, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine protects individu-
als from exploitation in bargaining with the state. The concern is 
that, in light of the enormous power imbalances that exist between 
the state and any private individual, the individual may be coerced to 
give up a constitutional right in the guise of a consensual exchange. 
invalidated by state constitutional and statutory provisions outlawing lottery opera-
tions, because the state lacked authority to enter the original contract under the re-
served powers doctrine). 
89. Wegner, supra note 1, at 967. 
90. Judith Welch Wegner, Utopian Visions: Cooperation Without Conflicts in 
Public I Private Ventures, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 313, 337 (1991). 
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In this sense, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine creates a 
presumption that all such bargains are invalid under the contract 
law principle of duress. To the individual who would argue that she 
retain her autonomy to bargain with her rights if she chooses, the 
strongest policy rationale answers that the doctrine is less about pa-
ternalism and more about constraining government abuse. If a state 
actor knows that such a deal will be unenforceable, the incentives to 
wrongfully wield authority abate. Professor Fennell explains that 
the doctrine is thus best understood not in reference to protecting the 
individual's best interest in any given case, but as a legitimizing con-
straint on state action: 
Much analysis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has 
focused on whether the government's bargain would leave the 
individual better or worse off than she otherwise would be-in 
other words, whether it is a true 'offer,' as opposed to a 'threat.' 
. . . It is more accurate and fruitful to think of the Constitution 
as placing structural constraints on the kinds of decisions offi-
cials and entities are permitted to make about individuals' lives, 
and to view the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as an ex-
tension of these structural constraints. Applied to the bargain-
ing setting, these structural constrains limit the sorts of things 
that a particular governmental entity can legitimately give and 
receive in trade .... 
Considered in this light, the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine encompasses three distinct types of wrongful govern-
mental action: (1) receiving forbidden goods, (2) bargaining with 
currency illegitimately appropriated from the other party; and 
(3) bargaining with currency illegitimately appropriated from 
segments of the community that are not represented at the bar-
gaining table. 91 
She further cautions that the problems at the heart of unconstitu-
tional conditions-though implicated in private-public dealmaking-
are endemic not to bargaining but to government, and the potential 
for abuse by state actors: 
A doctrine which focuses attention on bargains qua bargains 
serves the practical function of promoting vigilance against gov-
ernment malfeasance in a setting where it is especially likely to 
be implicated. It is important to note that the bargaining con-
test merely offers a focal point for detecting otherwise illicit gov-
ernment conduct.92 
91. Fennell, supra note 40 at 43-45. 
92. Id at 45. 
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However persuasive its foundations, application of the doctrine is 
porous in practice. Although we continue to reject bargains involving 
voting rights, we don't object when the traded right is to trial by 
jury-as demonstrated by the hegemonic status of plea bargaining in 
the criminal justice system. Arguments for application in the realm 
of land use planning are few, and weak. 93 
The Rehabilitation of Contract Zoning? Some would argue that 
the general rejection of contract zoning in the 1950s and 60s has been 
circumvented by the subsequent widespread adoption of conditional 
zoning agreements, under which-without legally committing itself 
to a zoning change-the municipality secures a property owner's 
promise to provide a remedial exaction or limit the proposed use in 
some way as a condition of approval. Whereas contract zoning binds 
the government to a certain course of action by virtue of its promise 
to rezone, conditional zoning "contemplates a preceding act by the 
property owner as a prerequisite to the approval a rezoning peti-
tion,"94 thus enabling the government to retain and satisfy its police 
power responsibility to see that the zoning change is consistent with 
the public interest. 
Conditional zoning has gained wide acceptance to ameliorate the 
rigidity of Euclid-style zoning.95 For example, grouping all bargain-
based land use mechanisms together under the heading "incentive 
zoning," Professor Jerold Kayden describes the practice and the sup-
port it enjoyed before the new takings jurisprudence: 
Through the land use regulatory technique formally known as 
"incentive zoning," cities grant private real estate developers 
the legal right to disregard zoning restrictions in return for 
their voluntary agreement to provide urban design features 
such as plazas, atriums, and parks, and social facilities and ser-
vices such as affordable housing, day care centers, and job train-
ing. Since its inception some thirty years ago, incentive zoning 
has enjoyed broad support from developers and their attorneys, 
avoiding the legal challenges commonly brought against land 
use regulations requiring the provision of public amenities.96 
More modest bargain-based zoning mechanisms operate under the 
comparatively neutral nomenclature of conditional use permits and 
development agreements. 97 Many argue that the dichotomy drawn 
93. Cf id.; Kayden, supra note 58, at 41-43 (dismissing the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine as a constraint on municipal land use bargains). 
94. Lewis et al., supra note 70, at § IV(B). 
95. ld. at § IV(E). 
96. Kayden, supra note 58, at 3-4. 
97. See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 90 at 338. 
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between contract and conditional zoning creates a distinction without 
a meaningful difference.9s 
Municipal Bargaining as Mediation. Perhaps the most convinc-
ing theoretical analysis of the necessary role of bargaining in local 
land use decisionmaking is from a 1983 analysis by Professor Carol 
Rose. Working from an antifederalist perspective emphasizing local 
participation over representative deliberation, Professor Rose has 
proposed that mediation provides the most workable model from 
which to understand and theorize about local land use dispute 
resolution: 
[Local zoning proceedings) are far more realistically perceived 
as mediative than quasi-judicial. This is true with regard to the 
quintessential small change, the variance; adjustment boards 
treat requests for special zoning treatment as potential sources 
of disputes, taking into account neighborhood protests and im-
posing conditions in order to reach accommodation. More so-
phisticated devices such as "planned unit developments" do the 
same (although sometimes on a larger scale): local boards at-
tend to disputes and attempt to find packages of conditions that 
will lead to accommodation .... Even where the courts reject 
these "dealing" qualities and attempt to treat piecemeal changes 
quasi-judicially, they seem unable to avoid mediative forms, 
with the concomitant expansion of issues and accommodation-
centered goals. 
A mediation model is more realistic and less distorting than 
plan jurisprudence in deciphering not only the procedures of 
piecemeal changes, but also the relationships among planning, 
general ordinances, and piecemeal changes. In particular, if 
piecemeal changes are treated as mediations, their "dealing'" as-
pects are not an undesirable aberration but natural parts of the 
dispute resolution. In keeping with the open norms of media-
tion, an appropriate solution is not always a single answer com-
plying with fixed standards, but rather a mix of 
accommodations. Examples of these wide-ranging accommoda-
tions abound in modern land use practice .... To be sure, as Lon 
Fuller has argued, government mediation differs from the usual 
form: the government mediator has the authority to impose a 
98. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 372 ("Most recent decisions aban-
don the prohibition on contract zoning, at least for those contracts now euphemisti-
cally styled as 'conditional' zoning."); see also Wegner, supra note 1, at 977-80 
(grouping contract and conditional zoning techniques together under a theory of"con-
tingent zoning"). 
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solution, and thus would seem free to favor one side over an-
other. But this may not make a great deal of difference in prac-
tice ... even the mediator with a direct interest in the outcome is 
expected to hear all parties and come to an acceptable 
compromise. 99 
Mediation practice has developed considerably since Rose wrote, of-
fering a potentially useful font of resources-including best practices 
and ethical guidelines-that potentially bear on more modern 
problems in municipal land use bargaining. Professor Lawrence 
Susskind has made particularly skillful use of mediation practice in 
the related realm of negotiated rulemaking.1oo 
The Spectrum of Potential Bargains. Thus, the tools of zoning 
offer private and public parties of interest to a proposed land use a 
series of bargaining alternatives. 
When a developer seeks permission to build in contravention of a 
municipal zoning ordinance, bargaining options may be represented 
along a continuum between rigid adherence to the plan and free-mar-
ket flexibility to bargain. At the adherence end of the spectrum, the 
municipality could (and indeed should) simply deny the request to 
protect against the harms implied by violating the land use plan. 
This is the response dictated by the traditional (but generally repudi-
ated) zoning model discussed above. 
Alternatively, the municipality and the developer could negotiate 
a solution whereby the project would be allowed subject to the devel-
oper's remedying the harm. Although the scope of what would consti-
tute an adequate remedy is left to the parties, we might consider this 
form of bargaining constrained by a nexus, or relationship, in the me-
dium of exchange. Some relationship would exist between the pro-
scribed harm and the consideration provided by the developer in 
exchange for the discretionary permit. 
At the most flexible end of the bargaining spectrum, the munici-
pality could decide that although the development implies real harm 
for some public good that may be fundamentally irremediable-it 
might nevertheless grant an exception allowing the project if the de-
veloper makes available resources to provide some unrelated public 
good that the community values more than it does prevention of the 
99. Rose, supra note 62, at 889-92. 
100. Lawrence Susskind, The Risks and the Advantages of Agency Discretion: Evi-
dence from EPA's Project XL, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 67 (1999). See also Jody 
Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 
NYU ENVTL. L. J. 60 (2000) (discussing participant experiences in negotiated 
rulemaking). 
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avoidable harm. Taking a step further in this direction, if it really 
values the proposed benefit more than it does prevention of the avoid-
able harm, the municipality might trade its permission for the provi-
sion of an unrelated public benefit even if the initial harm could be 
remedied. These are the conditions of full-free market bargaining, 
under which all parties are at liberty to alienate rights and entitle-
ments as they please. 
In 1986, municipalities and landowners operated along various 
points of this continuum, variously constrained by local regulations, 
the boundaries of one another's' willingness to deal, the peculiar cir-
cumstances of each individual proposal, good faith and common 
sense. 
Enter the takings revolution. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS: THE REINVENTION OF TAKINGS 
In recent years, responding to concerns that landowners were 
unduly suffering at the hands of municipal planners, the Supreme 
Court has reinvigorated takings remedies as a means of strengthen-
ing private property rights against regulatory interference. In a 
noteworthy departure from other areas of jurisprudence where it has 
strengthened public interests at the expense of private interests, 101 
the Court has shifted the rules for resolving municipal land use dis-
putes from a set more respectful of the police power to a set signifi-
cantly more solicitous of private rights. 
Many observers have condemned the new takings jurisprudence 
for its weakening of a community's ability to regulate for the public 
101. For example, compare the Supreme Court's rebalancing of private rights and 
police power interests in its habeas corpus jurisprudence in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443, 447 (1953) (expanding access to habeas in holding that federal claims adjudi-
cated in a state court could be raised for federal de novo review on habeas) (abrogated 
by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2259(d)) 
with Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (curtailing access to habeas in holding 
that state level procedural defaults including, failures to properly raise constitutional 
claims, may be treated as deliberate waiver preempting federal habeas review); and 
in its abortion rights jurisprudence, compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) 
(establishing the three-trimester rule for balancing the woman's private right to bod-
ily autonomy against the state's interest in fetal life, under which the private right is 
paramount until the second trimester) with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (replacing the Roe trimester rule 
with a balancing test that increases the state's power to restrict first and second tri-
mester abortions). 
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health and safety;102 just as many have praised the Court for bolster-
ing the special deference that has historically adhered to rights in 
real property. 103 Indeed, a rule that would satisfy both sides is prob-
ably impossible to create. However, the immediate effect of the new 
rules, established in a several important cases since 1987, is to dras-
tically reduce the permissible scope of bargaining in land use dispute 
resolution. Whether or not any party of interest truly stands to bene-
fit remains unclear. 
The Historical Roots of Takings Doctrine. As the zoning model of 
land use regulation assumed prominence, governments at all levels 
struggled to balance the tension between those aspects of land owner-
ship recognized as inherently private and the collective responsibili-
ties associated with land use choices by communities; the zone of 
conflict between them is nowhere more observable than in the law-
suits that arise between private and public parties to takings dis-
putes. In the regional planning context, a taking complaint arises 
when a landowner alleges that government action infringes on her 
property rights beyond the bounds permitted by legitimate zoning 
authority. 104 
In wrestling with these difficult cases, courts have proposed an 
evolving directive as to where the balance should be struck. Al-
though early understandings of the takings clause presumed its ap-
plication only to physical invasions of land, 105 the Supreme Court 
first recognized in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 106 the possibility 
that a statute could so restrict land use as to constitute a taking of 
property rights requiring compensation. In Pennsylvania Coal, the 
Court held that a statute prohibiting coal mining in a manner that 
102. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Discourse, Social Vision, and the Su-
preme Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian Recurrence 
in First English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. CoLO. L. REv. 427, 470-71 
(1988). 
103. See, e.g., Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, the Individual, and Society: 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 52 Mo. L. REv. 162, 164 (1993). 
104. Some complaints allege that the comprehensive plan itself constitutes a tak-
ing. See, e.g., Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 1999). 
105. Mugler v. Kansas, 8 S. Ct. 273, 276 (1887) (holding in that regulatory inter-
ference with economic use of land does not constitute a taking when regulation is a 
valid expression of the police power); see also William Michael Treanor, The Original 
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 
782, 785-92 (1995) (discussing the limited historical basis for the rule of compensating 
takings and the early practice of applying the rule only for physical invasion); PERCI-
VAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 780-81. 
106. 260 u.s. 393, 415-16 (1922). 
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could damage homes on the surface effected a taking because it effec-
tively abolished the value of the underlying mineral rights.107 Penn-
sylvania Coal represents the first successful "regulatory taking" 
claim and an early high point of the Supreme Court's interest in pri-
vate property rights against public claims-an apex only notable in 
light of the changes that immediately followed. 
The 1922 Pennsylvania Coal decision preceded the Court's 1926 
validation of zoning laws in Euclid, and perhaps coincidentally, the 
Court shortly thereafter retreated from the strong implications of the 
Pennsylvania Coal view. Only a few years later, that case was not 
even cited in a 1928 decision rejecting a similarly-reasoned taking 
claim and affirming that even regulations resulting in the destruc-
tion of property will not effect takings if they are designed to protect 
against certain kinds of public harm.- In Miller v. Schoene,108 the 
Court reiterated the legitimacy of the police power to vindicate the 
public welfare, noting that "where the public interest is involved, pre-
ferment of that interest over the property interests of the individual, 
to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing char-
acteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects prop-
erty."109 Over the next half-century, regulatory takings claims were 
subject to a form of rational basis scrutiny affording deference to local 
land use regulation. no 
For a moment in 1987, it may have seemed that the cycle had 
fully turned when the Court decided Keystone Bituminous Coal v. 
DeBenedictis.l11 Evaluating facts nearly identical to those in Penn-
sylvania Coal, the Court reached the opposite conclusion-finding no 
taking because the challenged mining restrictions responded to a sig-
nificant threat to public safety.l12 
First English and the Advent of Temporary Takings Liability. 
However, 1987 proved a watershed year in takings jurisprudence less 
107. Id. 
108. 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928) (upholding against a taking claim a state law used to 
require the destruction of a diseased tree on private land to prevent the spread of the 
disease to trees on neighboring lands). 
109. ld. at 279-280. 
110. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). Cf Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 843-45 (1987) (Brennan, J. dis-
senting); see also ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 341 (noting great judicial 
deference to zoning decisions based on their "legislative" nature). 
111. 480 u.s. 470 (1987). 
112. ld. (distinguishing Pennsylvania Coal by finding no evidence that the chal-
lenged law had unduly interfered with Keystone Bituminous's "investment-backed 
expectations"). 
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for resolving the hanging Pennsylvania Coal issue and more for chal-
lenging the settled parameters of the public-private balance in tak-
ings disputes. Although Keystone Bituminous vindicated the public 
interest over the private, two other 1987 decisions were designed to 
temper what the Court perceived as unauthorized public overreach-
ing. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los 
Angeles,113 the Court articulated a stunning new reach for regulatory 
takings. Using a case ultimately dismissed on remand for its weak 
facts, the Court established municipal liability to compensate tempo-
rary takings through damages despite a state law limiting remedies 
to invalidation of the regulation effecting a taking. Recognizing that 
invalidation of a zoning ordinance could potentially render any regu-
latory act a temporary taking, the Court nevertheless held that the 
Constitution requires "that the government pay the landowner for 
the value of the use of the land during this period."114 First English 
raised the possibility not only that retracted municipal regulations 
could generate takings claims, but that municipalities could be sub-
ject to monetary damages even after their retraction. The decision 
poses a considerable deterrent to municipal experimentation with 
land use regulations that could later be declared takings. 
The Nollan "Nexus" Principle. Then, in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission, 115 arguably the most important of the 1987 tril-
ogy, the Court tightened its scrutiny of conditional use permits and 
regulatory exactions, requiring a firm nexus between harm and 
remediation. In Nollan, landowners brought a takings suit after un-
successfully seeking permission to expand development on the prop-
erty in contravention of a coastal zoning ordinance. Finding that the 
new construction would obstruct visual access to the seashore, the 
Coastal Commission had offered the desired permit in exchange for 
an easement that would allow the public access across a portion of 
the Nollans' property connecting two public beaches. Writing for the 
Court, Justice Scalia observed that the government could reasonably 
require an exaction that substantially furthered the interest frus-
trated by the permitted use-for example, the construction of a public 
viewing platform to allow visual access to the beach over the top of 
the development.116 However, as the proposed condition lacked an 
113. 482 u.s. 304, 318 (1987). 
114. Id. at 319. Nevertheless, the claim in question was ultimately rejected on 
remand, as the challenged regulation was found to promote the legitimate interest of 
public safety and was also a reasonable temporary measure. First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1367 (1989). 
115. 483 u.s. 825, 839 (1987). 
116. Id. at 836. 
Spring 2002] Zoning, Taking, and Dealing 363 
"essential nexus" to the harm threatened by the disfavored use, the 
Court found it unauthorized by the zoning law, and that absent legiti-
mate police power authority to prevent the development, the govern-
ment had indeed effected a taking.117 Although the Commission 
could have withheld the permit altogether, the Court reasoned, it 
could not condition the permit on a concession by the applicant un-
connected to the justification for a legitimate prohibition.118 
As Justice Scalia explained in a later decision, the Nollan nexus 
principle was articulated to protect property owners against munici-
pal "extortion"119 by constraining the scope of permissible bargaining 
in land use disputes. And indeed, the new doctrine significantly mod-
ified the available options to municipal parties entertaining applica-
tions for controversial land use permits. On the spectrum of potential 
bargaining, the nexus rule continues to allow for some municipal bar-
gaining, but eliminates the third and fourth set of possible deals (the 
free-market bargains). Requiring nexus clearly constrains potential 
abuse, but reducing the permissible scope of bargaining also limits 
the creativity with which landowners and municipalities can ap-
proach complex land use problems. 
Since 1987, the Court's takings jurisprudence has grown increas-
ingly solicitous ofthe private interests in land use. Most famously, in 
1992, the Court revisited the problem raised in Pennsylvania Coal 
and Keystone Bituminous of defining regulatory takings. In Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Commission, 120 the Court found a taking 
where a developer was denied permission to build in a coastal erosion 
zone, clarifying that takings liability will be found whenever land use 
regulations effect a full deprivation (or "total wipeout") of economi-
cally viable uses of a parcel of land.121 Despite lingering questions 
about the meaning of "full deprivation" and the severability of land 
117. Id. at 837. 
118. Id. 
119. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994). ("The absence of a nexus 
left the Coastal Commission in the position of simply trying to obtain an easement 
through gimmickry, which converted a valid regulation of use into an 'out-and-out 
plan of extortion"') (citations omitted). 
120. 505 u.s. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
121. The events that followed the Lucas case are apocryphal. In 1993, the South 
Carolina Coastal Council agreed to permit the development, but Lucas pursued tem-
porary takings compensation in state court. In 1993, the Council settled the lawsuit 
by agreeing to purchase the parcel for $850,000, plus $725,000 in interest, attorneys' 
fees, and costs, for a total settlement of $1,575,000. The following year, the state 
resold the parcel to a developer who built in the restricted erosion zone. In 1996, 
severe coastal erosion undermined the house in the Lucas lot and an adjacent home. 
Nevertheless, other South Carolina homeowners are seeking to overturn state anti-
erosion land use regulations. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 803. 
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parcels for the purposes of this analysis, 122 the Lucas decision signi-
fied the seriousness with which the Court meant to reallocate the 
costs of public land use regulation away from private property hold-
ers. Commentators warned municipalities that the Court's clear 
message was that the public-private balance in land use interests 
had leaned too far in favor of the public. 123 
The Other Shoe Drops: Dolan and ((Rough Proportionality." Two 
years later, the Court dealt the final blow to municipal land use bar-
gaining. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, 124 the Court again narrowed the 
permissible circumstances under which land use permits could be 
conditioned on related concessions, adding to the Nollan requirement 
a stricter standard of proportionality. On the spectrum of potential 
bargaining, the new rule serves to considerably reduce potential bar-
gains even in the nexus set, by eliminating possibilities for parties to 
trade on the different values each assigns to goods of the negotiation. 
In Dolan, when a hardware retailer sought permission to pave a 
large parking lot and expand the business into the restricted flood-
plain of a local river, the municipality approved the development sub-
ject to conditions imposed by its comprehensive plan. In light of the 
increased storm-water runoff implied by the paved lot and the in-
creased traffic promoted by the expanded business, the municipality 
proposed conditioning the permit on the dedication of a portion of the 
property lying in the floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage 
122. See, e.g., id. at 800-02. One problem with the Lucas decision is referred to as 
the "denominator problem," because the Court left unclear how to evaluate when a 
total wipeout has occurred. If a regulation extinguishes all economically viable use 
from 75% of a large land parcel, does that represent a "total wipeout" of the economi-
cally viable use of that part of the land, or has no taking occurred because there is still 
economically viable use of the remaining 25%? See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1061-77 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
123. Despite the universal anticipation of large-scale changes immediately after 
Lucas, commentators more recently note that little has changed. See, e.g., PERCIVAL 
ET AL., supra note 19. However, in recent treatment of comparable takings claims, the 
Federal Circuit appears to be leaning again toward a standard of greater municipal 
deference in its increasingly stringent evaluation of "reasonable, investment-backed 
expectations" in analyzing claims of undue economic deprivations. Several recent de-
cisions consider whether market conditions at the time of investment reflected zoning 
ordinances such that reasonable investment-backed expectations should be consid-
ered to reflect applicable land use restrictions. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189 
F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cl. 1999) (holding that the denial of a permit to develop wet-
lands was not a taking because the owner did not have "reasonable, investment-
backed expectations" to develop the wetland in light of the regulatory climate in place 
when the developer acquired the land). 
124. 512 u.s. 374, 391 (1994). 
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system, and of an additional strip adjacent to the floodplain for ape-
destrian/bicycle pathway. Though the Court conceded that an "essen-
tial nexus" existed between the legitimate state interest and the 
permit condition exacted by the city, the Court nevertheless found 
that the exaction failed the "required degree" of connection between 
the exaction and the projected impact of the proposed development. 
Notably, the city could have simply denied the permit; it was the act 
of conditioning the permit on an unsubstantially related concession 
that failed the Court's scrutiny. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist called this new requirement the test of "rough 
proportionality. "125 
Mter the case was remanded to the state court, Dolan amended 
her complaint to include a temporary takings claim. She argued that 
not only was the regulatory exaction unconstitutional, but that the 
city's wrongful withholding of the building permit over the course of 
negotiation (and litigation) over the proposed use constituted an un-
constitutional temporary taking for which the city owed her compen-
sation. The City eventually paid $1.5 million in compensation. 126 
Suitum: Transferable Development Rights under Nexus and Pro-
portionality? A final takings case of note in the land use context is 
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,127 in which the Court 
held that failure to sell transferable development rights (TDRs) will 
not prevent ripeness of a taking claim. This decision is noteworthy in 
a discussion of bargaining because the sale of transferable develop-
ment rights suggests an elementary form of bargaining that may 
uniquely satisfy the tests of nexus and rough proportionality. Al-
though the Suitum decision primarily addresses the question of final-
ity (finding sufficient finality for ripeness when no further questions 
exist as to how the challenged regulation will affect the specific prop-
erty), the odd constellation of opinions suggests an interesting possi-
ble municipal defense to takings claims. In his concurrence, Justice 
Scalia argued that the matter of TDRs was irrelevant to the matter of 
whether a taking had occurred; their issue simply went to the eviden-
tiary matter of whether just compensation had been paid. However, 
since only three justices signed that concurrence, it is possible that a 
125. Three years later, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 
526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999), the Court limited application of the Dolan "rough propor-
tionality" test to disputes concerning exactions, holding it inapplicable in the context 
of outright permit denials. 
126. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 820. 
127. 520 u.s. 725, 733-34 (1997). 
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majority of the Court believes that the issuance of TDRs could auto-
matically defeat a takings claim, since their subsequent sale always 
renders at least some economically viable use of a property. 128 
v. THE AFTERMATH: THE IMPACT OF TAKINGS 
DECISIONS ON PLANNING 
Following the Court's decision in Dolan, commentators of all 
stripes hailed the significance of the decision and predicted a dra-
matic impact on local planning practice. 129 Five years later, however, 
the actual impact of the new rules remains unclear. Many commen-
tators and practitioners suggest that only marginal changes have oc-
curred.13o Why the disjuncture? 
Four possibilities arise: (1) no changes were necessary because 
most planners were already engaged in bargaining practices the Su-
preme Court would find acceptable under the new rules; (2) planners 
haven't changed their practices because they aren't sure how to 
change them to be in conformity with the new rules; (3) changes ha-
ven't occurred because the new rules are impossible to follow and 
planners are disregarding them; and ( 4) planners have not changed 
their practices because they don't care about breaking the law. Over-
whelming evidence (some reviewed above) suggests that the first al-
ternative does not represent reality, and the fourth alternative seems 
equally unlikely. The truth probably lies somewhere between the 
second and third proposition.131 
Anecdotal Evidence. Anecdotal evidence is decidedly mixed as to 
how the new rules have impacted practices at the ground level. Liz 
Newton, Assistant to the City Manager of Tigard, Oregon (the defen-
dant municipality in the Dolan case) reports that in Tigard, the plan-
ning process has become more formal but less creative-staff reports 
are longer, permit applications are scanned with a fine-tooth comb, 
and where once Tigard planners "followed the spirit of the law, now 
they hang on every letter."132 The rules have added to the cost of 
development in Tigard because the City now requires that developers 
provide all the studies necessary to document proportionality. 
128. Cf. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 828. 
129. See PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 1. 
130. See oral communication with Susskind, supra note 71. 
131. Professor Lawrence Susskind, among the most esteemed experts in the field 
of government land and environmental disputes resolution, suggests that local plan-
ners have continued to operate without regard to the rules, in part because they are 
difficult to understand and even more difficult to apply in the complex decisionmak-
ing arenas in which planners operate. Id. 
132. See interview with Newton, supra note 71. 
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Newton reports that after Dolan was decided, she took calls from 
planners all over the country, most of whom told her that they simply 
planned to "tighten up their codes" and avoid any action that could 
potentially lead to litigation.1aa 
According to Newton, Tigard planners felt particularly betrayed 
after the decision because they believed they had acted in complete 
concert with the law. Oregon is renowned for its regional planning 
programs, and all241 cities and 46 counties are governed by compre-
hensive plans that are reviewed by the state.134 The dedications that 
Tigard planners had asked for (and that became the subject of litiga-
tion in the Dolan case) were part of a comprehensive plan that had 
long been approved by the state; out of respect to landowners, dedica-
tions were to be required only at the time of a development permit-
ting, when a landowner would be expecting a new source of profit.135 
(She suggests that this is why the Dolan claim "sailed through the 
state courts without a hitch" before being taken up by the Supreme 
Court.)136 Unsure of how they could have done things differently, the 
response of Tigard planners has been simply to act conservatively, 
hold their heads down, and hope for the best.137 
Damon Smith, a former planner with the City Planning Office in 
Cincinnati, Ohio remembers planners feeling very concerned and "on 
edge" after the Nollan and Dolan cases were decided.138 "Everyone 
thought they would change the planning landscape," he recalls, but 
in the end, no real changes came to pass in terms of land uses and 
dealmaking.139 The only difference, he ultimately concludes, was 
that the bargaining was driven underground after Dolan: rather than 
meeting with the zoning authority to discuss mutually agreeable so-
lutions to a proposed land use requiring permission, developers fac-
ing the possibility of a denied permit would now meet directly with 
planning staff, with whom they would create an informal joint propo-
sal that they would later propose to the zoning authority on their own 
initiative.140 
Indeed, some states legally differentiate between (preferred) pro-






138. See interview with Smith, supra note 71. 
139. ld. 
140. ld. 
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originating from the municipality, 141 although the practice of "under-
ground bargaining" renders unclear any meaningful line between the 
two.142 The shift to underground bargaining described by the Cin-
cinnati planner is particularly troubling because it implicates the 
very equal protection values that opponents of spot and contract zon-
ing sought to protect, since the practice favors repeat players with 
special access to planning staff and knowledge of the underground 
bargaining ritual. The farther the bargaining process moves from the 
official authority, the more removed the process becomes from the 
public scrutiny that would expose favoritism or corruption. 
Anecdotal evidence thus suggests a mixed impact by the takings 
rules. It is reported that municipalities have enacted more exacting 
procedures to document nexus and proportionality that are costly and 
expensive, 143 and simultaneously reported that dealmaking is as 
much in evidence as it ever was, 144 in most respects unchanged.145 
Of course, the two are not incompatible truths. A study in California 
was recently undertaken to provide answers to these questions; its 
more rigorously gathered results confirm the anecdotal evidence. 
The California Planning Study. In the most comprehensive pri-
mary analysis to date, the California Research Bureau commissioned 
Daniel Pollak to research how the takings decisions are actually im-
pacting the practice of land use planning in the particularly growth-
embattled state of California.146 Pollak surveyed the director of 
every city and county planning department in the state, 147 performed 
follow-up interviews, and conducted six detailed case studies to ex-
plore the impacts of the Supreme Court's decisions, focusing on the 
following questions: 
• Visibility of takings issues: Are concerns about takings a 
prominent feature of land use issues today? To what degree 
141. See Wegner, supra note 1, at 992 (identifying Virginia, Iowa, and Minnesota 
as states that only allow contingent zoning deals when proposed by the landowner or 
are clearly "voluntary"). 
142. Furthermore, it is unclear why the origin of the proposal alters objections 
founded on both the reserved powers and unconstitutional conditions doctrines. See 
Kayden, supra note 58. 
143. See, e.g., interview with Newton, supra note 71. 
144. See, e.g., interview with Smith, supra note 71. 
145. See, e.g., oral communication with Susskind, supra note 71. 
146. See PoLLAK, supra note 16. 
147. Pollak received responses from 37 out of 58 counties (63%) and 274 out of 472 
cities (58.1 %). He notes that although his data pool is large, it is not a random sample 
because it includes only data from those who chose to respond. Id. at 13. 
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have local governments taken notice of the Supreme Court rul-
ings? Have the takings rulings created pressure on local gov-
ernments to change their practices, decisions or policies? 
• Impact of takings on land use planning and regulation: Have 
the takings rulings influenced how local governments plan and 
regulate land use? Have they made local governments more 
cautious? Has the fear of litigation created a chilling effect? 
How have local governments adapted to the changed legal 
climate? 
• Exactions: Have the takings rulings had an impact on how 
local governments use exactions? Have the rulings in any way 
inhibited their use of exactions as a tool for financing public in-
frastructure and services? 
• What are the policy implications of these changes?148 
369 
Although the survey targets familiarity with legal concepts and 
processes, Pollak considered and rejected sending the survey to gov-
ernment planning attorneys, as the research sought to identify the 
impact of these legal concerns on ground-level land-use 
decisionmaking. 
According to Pollack's results, the majority of planners claimed 
to be familiar with the First English, Nollan, and Dolan cases (but 
less so with Lucas, Suitum, and Del Monte Dunes), and county plan-
ners were more familiar with all cases than more local planners.149 
Takings disputes were twice as frequent at the county level than at 
the city level, and most often involved fees or exactions relating to 
open space, parks, trails, transportation infrastructure, and school 
fees. 150 Although 49% of counties and 22% of cities report receiving 
takings litigation threats at least once a year, very few have insur-
ance to cover liability arising from takings claims.15 1 Nineteen per-
cent of cities and 35% of counties reported reducing their use of some 
forms of fees and exactions in response to takings law, mostly those 
involving roads and traffic-related infrastructure, open space, trails, 
or public access to natural resources.152 Fifty-five percent of cities 
and 89% of counties report that they have adopted new standards for 
creating written findings or an administrative record ofland use deci-
sions, and 45% of cities and 42% of counties reported having adopted 
148. ld. at 2. 
149. ld. at 13-14. 
150. ld. at 5, Executive Summary. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
370 Harvard Negotiation Law Review [Vol. 7:337 
new standards, guidelines, or policies for the use of fees and 
exactions.153 
Most interestingly, the problem of disentangling the public from 
the private interests that land use planning seeks to protect was re-
flected in the planners' attitudes toward the value of the new takings 
rules. Pollak observes: 
We might expect planners to express their dissatisfaction with 
the current situation, since it imposes constraints on their pow-
ers to plan and regulate. However ... a clear majority of re-
spondents (74% of cities and 81% of counties) either agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement ["The nexus and rough pro-
portionality standards established by the Nollan and Dolan de-
cisions, when followed carefully, simply amount to good land use 
planning practice.") .... 
[However,] a minority (36% of both cities and counties) 
agree with the statement ["U.S. Supreme Court decisions on 
takings have helped to create a legal climate that reduces our 
city/county's ability to manage land development to serve the 
needs of our community."]. We might term this group the "wor-
ried planners." They tend to think that the takings issue has 
made it more difficult for them to do their job of serving the pub-
lic interest.154 
Notably, these two groups of planners-representing those who be-
lieve that nexus and proportionality represent good land use plan-
ning and those who believe that the Nollan and Dolan decisions have 
helped to create a legal climate that inhibits their ability to serve the 
public interest-were not mutually exclusive: 
It was quite possible ... for a respondent to see the Nollan and 
Dolan precedents as good land use planning practice and still 
feel the legal climate surrounding the takings issue was harm-
ful. Twelve counties, or one third, and 70 cities, or 26%, fit that 
description.155 
One possible inference from this paradox is that planners believe that 
bargains constrained by nexus and proportionality are generally good 
planning choices, but that the loss of flexibility to depart from that 
structure in some circumstances hampers their ability to solve the 
more complicated planning problems. Alternatively, it could be that 
the legal climate has simply shifted landowners' best alternative to a 
153. Id. at 6. 
154. Id. at 32-34, Full Study. 
155. Id. at 34. 
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negotiated agreement (BATNA) toward court, making the negotiation 
process more antagonistic. 
Despite its valuable portrait of the workings of California munic-
ipal planning (and its important recommendation that municipalities 
cooperate to insure against takings claims), 156 Pollak's study gener-
ally affirms the uncertainty surrounding the municipal response to 
takings questions that inspired the study in the first place. While 
many jurisdictions have not changed their regulatory behavior in re-
sponse to the takings rulings, a sizeable minority have done so.157 
Pollak's rigorous statistical analysis revealed no significant correla-
tion between community characteristics and survey responses, 158 
other than the city/county divide.159 
Nevertheless, Pollak concludes that takings are a high profile is-
sue in many communities, and that the Court's decisions are making 
an impact in many communities. The experience of increased cau-
tiousness is "pervasive," even among respondents who "had difficulty 
putting their finger on the precise changes that had occurred."160 
Sixty-three percent of cities and 60% of counties have contracted with 
consultants to prepare studies on fees and exactions.161 Planners 
note increased costs of compliance (especially in increments of time 
and money for compiling proportionality data), much of which is 
passed on to developers.162 Pollak quotes land use planning expert 
William Fulton as reporting that he has not seen much change in the 
156. Noting that nearly all commercial insurance policies available to cities and 
counties contain a standard exclusion that omits takings claims from coverage, Pollak 
suggests that cities follow the example of several large California cities that have 
organized under their joint powers authority the Big Independent Cities Excess Pool, 
which enables members to self-insure against takings liability. ld. at 77. 
157. ld. at 77-78; 6-7, Executive Summary. 
158. ld. at 115-29. Pollak did observe an increase in takings-related phenomena 
with increasing city population size (though not in counties), possibly the result of 
larger numbers of actors and development projects. However, the survey response 
rate also increased with city population size, indicating that this correlation may not 
be reliable. 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50. This may reflect the fact that 
counties are more likely to be in control of large tracts of undeveloped land and to 
represent more heterogeneous communities of interest, leading to conflicts over 
sprawl, open space, agricultural preservation, etc. PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 76. 
160. ld. at 79. 
161. ld. at 80. 
162. See, e.g., Clyde W. Forrest, Planned Unit Development and Takings Post Do-
lan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 571, 580-81 (1995) ("The expense and time delay of ad hoc 
studies to establish adequate findings of fact may kill worthwhile projects ... It must 
surely be understood by developers that such evidence will now be required of them at 
their expense."); interview with Newton, supra note 71 (noting that Tigard, Oregon, 
has passed most of the costs for such data gathering on to developers). 
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substantive practice of land use planning because of takings, but not-
ing that "it has changed the psychology when the planner and the 
developer are negotiating. It has given the developer more lever-
age."163 (In other words, and as suggested above, it has changed the 
parties' BATNAs.) 
Although recognizing that constraints on localities' abilities to fi-
nance public infrastructure through fees and exactions may strain 
local budgets and make it more difficult to simultaneously manage 
land use and accommodate growth, Pollak concludes that the takings 
issue can encourage beneficial rationalization of the planning pro-
cess.164 He takes encouragement from results indicating that "[t]he 
takings rules mean that decisions that are made in an ad hoc or im-
provisatory way will tend to be more vulnerable to legal challenge 
than those that are carefully formulated as part of a long-range 
policy ."165 
But this reasoning brings us full circle to the more important 
question at hand: whether or not constricting "ad hoc, improvisatory" 
decisionmaking is an unqualified good. As Contra Costa County re-
spondent Dennis Barry noted, the rules take the creativity out of 
planning, and he expressed nostalgia for the days before the new 
rules, when he could practice "the art of public administration, the 
ability to negotiate with applicants in administering regulations, not 
the cold hard science of Nollan and Dolan."166 Indeed, Pollak's rec-
ommendations to planners based on the results of the study are that 
they avoid case-by-case decisionmaking and employ comprehensive 
fee structures over exactions as much as possible to avoid even the 
threat of costly but ultimately meritless lawsuits. 167 He concedes 
that a staggering problem for older municipalities near build-out in 
the wake of nexus and proportionality is the problem of cumulative 
impacts, whereby individual impacts too small to justify exactions ag-
gregate over time to create significant demand for new infrastructure 
that must finally be realized when later development begins (but 
nexus and proportionality prevent assessing the cost from new devel-
opment beyond its share).168 
Bargaining Nexus and Proportionality. The problem of cumula-
tive impacts offers one lens through which to analyze the question of 
163. See PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 80. 
164. ld. at 75-76, 81. 
165. Id. at 8, Executive Summary. 
166. Id. at 82, Full Study. 
167. Id. at 89-90. 
168. Id. at 83. 
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the permissible scope of bargaining under nexus and proportionality. 
Costs are difficult to allocate proportionately over time, especially 
when earlier cost-bearers are no longer available to absorb a cost that 
becomes manifest to a community only at the tipping point of the new 
development. What kinds of bargains should be allowed when a per-
fect mechanism of cost-allocation is not available? Consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical land use conflict: 
Suppose a landowner seeks to subdivide property on which she 
lives to allow a developer to construct there a small set of luxury con-
dominiums. She lives on part of a large parcel at the edge of a pro-
tected greenbelt, and she wants to sell the vacant land to finance her 
children's educations (or a church food pantry, or a free veterinary 
clinic, or to send a local fourth grade class to college ... ). The vacant 
area is the last undeveloped area in the district of the municipality 
zoned for single-family homes, and the surrounding community relies 
on public infrastructure already burdened to capacity. Because the 
developer wants to build multi-unit housing, he needs to obtain some 
kind of variance from the zoning board in order to build. 
The zoning board does not object in principle to the condomini-
ums, because there are not many of them, they are to be located in 
the farthest outskirts of town, and designs indicate that they will be 
mostly hidden from the view of other homeowners. The members of 
the board do not believe that allowing the construction would under-
mine the values articulated in the community's comprehensive plan. 
However, existing sewer infrastructure would collapse if subject to 
the additional strain of these new homes without improvement, and 
soil conditions (and local ordinances) render the area unsuitable for 
septic use. Absent the new development, the sewers can be main-
tained through the usual means afforded by local property taxes, but 
the board cannot allow the development to proceed without a plan for 
improving the lines that would connect the new condominiums with 
the municipal waste treatment plant. 
Most community members are indifferent to the construction of 
the new units, but they are unwilling to pay more taxes to finance the 
needed improvements. Area environmentalists strongly oppose the 
construction of a new waste treatment site, as they believe that a 
significant expansion of infrastructure would ultimately encourage a 
relaxation of planning ordinances to allow incursion into the pro-
tected green space surrounding the community. Since this is the last 
undeveloped area in the district, the municipality cannot expect to 
gradually recoup investment in improved lines from later develop-
ment projects. 
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Thus, the board is considering two options. First, it could simply 
deny the requested use, since they possess full authority under the 
zoning laws to decline permission for variances. Alternatively, it 
could approve the variance through a conditional use permit accord-
ing to which the developer would agree to conduct or finance the nec-
essary improvements required by the new units. 
Naturally, the developer would prefer not to finance the improve-
ments single-handedly, but he believes that area characteristics will 
render the luxury condominiums exceedingly valuable, probably 
enough so that he would earn a handsome profit even under the 
terms of the municipality's conditional use proposal. In any event, 
the deal would remain particularly appealing if the landowner dis-
counts her selling price in light of the municipal exaction. Since a 
sale to a multiunit developer even at a discount will bring her a bet-
ter price than a sale for the development of a single-family house, he 
thinks it likely that the landowner will bargain. 
What should happen here? Before Nollan, it is likely that the 
board would not have skipped a beat in proposing the exaction as a 
condition of approving the requested use. Before Dolan, the proposal 
may still have survived a takings challenge, because the exaction ar-
guably bears the Nollan-required nexus to the preventable harm. 
The municipality would take the position that the zoning ordinance 
requires single-family homes because, inter alia, the sewer system 
cannot support the increased burden of multiunit residential housing 
on small lots of land. 
However, the proposal would almost certainly fail the scrutiny 
afforded by Dolan's additional requirement. Although the nature of 
the exaction is tailored to remedy the harm implied by the noncon-
forming use, its scope lacks the rough proportionality required by the 
Supreme Court. The new units will only marginally increase the 
strain on existing infrastructure that has been brought to capacity 
over time with the construction of each new single-family home. 
Under the rubric of rough proportionality, the magnitude of the exac-
tion must be proportional to the magnitude of the harm implied by 
the proposed variance. The "last developer in line" cannot be made to 
shoulder the entire costs of new infrastructure necessitated not just 
by the project in question but by years of growth in a community.169 
Does it matter that "but for" the contribution of this develop-
ment, the admittedly useful improvements would be unnecessary? 
Thus far, the "but-for problem" has not received attention from the 
169. Id. at 83-84. 
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Court. However, the tenacity of the Dolan opinion should give any 
municipality pause in testing judicial patience on the matter. As no-
tably demonstrated in Dolan's temporary takings claim after her Su-
preme Court victory, the combustible pairing of nexus and 
proportionality with the First English precedent results in considera-
ble municipal exposure to damages liability if a landowner seeking a 
questionable permit challenges a proposed exaction. Under the cur-
rent regime, the municipality should always deny a controversial per-
mit, because attempts to negotiate a creative exaction could, if 
invalidated, expose the municipality to liability for a temporary tak-
ing over the period during which development was delayed (or at 
least to the legal costs of defending itself). The negotiating environ-
ment created by these legal rules yields a strong incentive for munici-
palities to simply deny permits, even when a mutually beneficial 
trade could be engineered that would satisfy the landowner and miti-
gate the public harms associated with the project. 
But what about the possibility of mutually beneficial trades? 
Should it matter if the municipality, landowner, and developer would 
each be happy with the bargain? According to the facts of the above 
hypothetical, a rationally acting developer would want to abide by 
the terms of the conditional use permit, if the alternative is that the 
permit be denied, since he stands to turn a profit. The landowner 
would want to sell the land for the highest price possible, which may 
be to the developer, even at a discount. (Of course, if the landowner 
could successfully invalidate the condition in court, receive a full 
price, and receive compensation for a temporary taking, she might 
prefer that alternative instead.) The municipality might be more 
neutral toward the deal than the other parties, but the deal would 
nevertheless please one community member without unduly harming 
others, slightly increase the local tax base, and yield beneficial im-
provements to the sewer system. Why shouldn't the parties be able 
to reach a deal that pleases everyone involved? 
Perhaps it is because it would be impossible to create a legal rule 
that successfully limits bad bargains without preventing some benefi-
cial bargains, and the harms of exploitative or irresponsible deals be-
tween government and individuals might outweigh the benefits of a 
few good deals. But this brings us back to the theme of this discus-
sion: what is a bad bargain in the land use context? Are nexus and 
proportionality really the best tool to separate the bad from the good? 
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VI. MAKING SENSE OF THE JUDICIAL REPUDIATION OF BARGAINING 
In fact, taken together, the nexus and proportionality doctrines 
stand for the proposition that most potential bargains are bad. 
Nexus and proportionality erect a jurisprudential barrier to value-
creating exchange that would lie at the heard of successful negotiated 
resolutions to land use conflicts. 
The nexus doctrine limits the set of possible municipal-land-
owner exchanges to those in which the goods of the exchange are re-
lated across the medium of prohibitable harm, i.e. directly remedial 
measures. In other words, a locality may not trade away its ability to 
prevent a harm to extract benefits that it values more than the pre-
vention of said harm. Under nexus, a city cannot bargain away its 
discretion to disallow construction of a mall in a residential area in 
exchange for the construction of a public pool, or its ability to prevent 
the siting of a toxic waste dump in exchange for the construction of 
low-income housing. The doctrine of rough proportionality further 
limits the set of possible exchanges to strictly proportionate, directly 
remedial measures. 
These constraints eliminate the vast sources of difference that 
give rise to value-creating exchanges. Scholars of negotiation empha-
size the importance of considering unrelated goods in formulating op-
tions for value-creating exchanges, often noting the proverbial tale of 
the two children who fight over an orange. Eventually they split it, 
each unhappy to receive only half, and one eats the fruit and throws 
away the peel while the other discards the fruit and uses the peel for 
baking a cake. 1 70 The moral of the story is that the two could have 
negotiated a better outcome by realizing how their interests differed 
and then crafting a bargain to exploit that difference. 
In a realm of unregulated land use bargaining, differences that 
could yield value arise between parties' different resource needs, time 
horizons, or risk preferences. A community might indeed prefer tol-
erating a toxic dump in exchange for low-income housing that it des-
perately needs, or tolerate nonconforming uses in the short term to 
generate a tax base from which to realize desired planning goals in 
the future, and some scholars vigorously argue that such exchanges 
should be possible. 171 As noted by the authors of Beyond Winning: 
Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and Disputes: "the truth is that 
differences are often more useful than similarities in helping parties 
170. See, e.g., RoGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 56-57 (2d ed. 1991). 
171. Cf. Fennell, supra note 40, at 16-27. 
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reach a deal. Differences set the stage for possible gains from trade, 
and it is through trades that value is most commonly created."172 
The point is well-framed by Professor Jerold Kayden, who notes the 
irony of the facts in Nollan: 
A ban on unrelated amenities interferes not only with the pref-
erences of [communities], but potentially with those of property 
owners as well. Given the choice between the "unrelated" beach 
easement and the "related" viewing spot, for example, the Nol-
lans might very well have selected the beach easement. In the 
typical incentive zoning transaction, the developer's choice be-
tween related and unrelated amenities would reduce to an eco-
nomic calculus in which developers, in return for a bonus, would 
prefer to provide an inexpensive unrelated amenity rather than 
an expensive related one.173 
And according to his analysis, nothing in the Constitution distin-
guishes the kind of bargaining that the Supreme Court has found ac-
ceptable under nexus and proportionality from the unrelated amenity 
bargaining it rejects.174 
The "nexus and proportionality" barrier to municipal land use 
bargaining is controversial for several reasons. As a preliminary 
matter, the doctrines pose a striking theoretical repudiation of the 
way that most land use dispute resolution takes place. As discussed 
above, the bulk of land use planning now occurs in particularized 
decisionmaking regarding unique parcels of land, and the decision-
making process is frequently characterized as one of dealmaking. It 
seems unlikely that the Court anticipated the scope of these doc-
trines' impact without calling more attention to that in its decisions, 
raising the possibility that its members had not understood the full 
implications of their decision (or more likely, the actual nature of 
planning practice). But a jurisprudence that speaks to a system 
other than what planners use cannot provide adequate guidance or 
constraint. Writing four years before even Nollan was decided, Pro-
fessor Rose asserts that 
the jurisprudence of land decisions is bound to fail unless it 
takes account of how these decisions are actually made. Given 
the constitutionality of local land use controls, and the likeli-
hood of their continued and even expanded use, such a jurispru-
dence should attempt to clarify and refine actual practice. This 
172. MNOOKIN, ET AL. supra note 6, at 14. 
173. Kayden, supra note 58, at 48. 
174. Id. at 47-49. This discussion sets aside (for the moment) the problem of how 
power imbalances between parties can impact the fairness and results of an unregu-
lated bargaining process, addressed infra, in text accompanying notes 181-82. 
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in turn suggests not only an inquiry into local institutional legit-
imacy, but also a direct approach to the 'dealing' characteristics 
of local land controls. 175 
That the nexus and proportionality may be speaking to some system 
of land use planning other than the one we have lends credence to the 
two explanations proposed above for the lack of meaningful change in 
planning practice since Dolan. 176 
Taking the argument one step further, Professor Fennell main-
tains not only that the Nollan and Dolan rules seem directed to a 
model of land use conflict resolution not actually in use, but that they 
are theoretically inconsistent with the rest of the regulatory land-
scape. She argues that the application of nexus and proportionality 
to bargains in the exaction context cannot be squared with the thus-
far intact authority of municipalities to regulate land use without the 
constraints of nexus and proportionality, creating a system funda-
mentally unfair to landowners and generally bad for communities: 
[Nollan and Dolan] require the government to identify and 
quantify development-specific negative externalities when it 
seeks to obtain a concession of property from a landowner. 
However, the Court has not required the underlying land use 
regulations-the subject of such bargains-to exhibit a propor-
tionate relationship to the harms they claim to prevent .... 
This limitation is understandable; wholesale application of Do-
lan to regulatory takings jurisprudence would abruptly disman-
tle nearly seventy-five years of zoning law. Yet Dolan's 
proportionality rule, thus limited, represents a logical anomaly. 
Land use bargains are constrained by proportionality require-
ments, while land use decisions made by local governmental 
bodies are not. 
The result is a conceptual disconnect that has become increasingly 
problematic in the years since Nollan and Dolan were decided. The 
current state of land use jurisprudence, which couples relatively 
open-ended regulatory power with tight restrictions on regulatory 
bargains, represents the worst of both worlds. It leaves landowners 
exposed to excessive land use regulations while constricting their 
ability to bargain for regulatory adjustments. Without meaningful 
constraints on the underlying land use regulations, limits on land use 
bargains cannot provide landowners with protections against over-
regulation. Instead, these bargaining limits add insult to injury by 
175. Rose, supra note 62, at 847. 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31. 
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preventing mutually beneficial land use deals and generating vast 
inefficiencies that harm landowners and communities.177 
If the Supreme Court intended to level the playing field between 
government and property owners, she argues, the new rules only 
worsen the imbalance, because they constrain only the flexibility of 
the landowner (the government can always set the baseline rules in 
whatever array will serve advantageous for future bargains, through 
such practices as "downzoning."l78). 
Fennel's critique is particularly potent if the Court's true objec-
tive in Nollan and Dolan was to protect private property rights 
against undue public incursion. If so, their response to this substan-
tive end was a procedural device that, at least according to Fennell, 
has backfired. She argues that, although property-rights advocates 
have been hoodwinked by the property-rights rhetoric in Dolan, the 
decision significantly harms their interests by restricting their rights 
to freely alienate. The proscription on bargaining, she warns, ulti-
mately comes down to one less stick in the bundle.179 Fennell's own 
proposal for righting the broken scale is to return private rights to 
negotiate within a bargaining model that protects against public ex-
ploitation through an in-kind call option (by which landowners would 
be permitted non-conforming uses if they can demonstrate reasona-
ble plans to effectively remedy feared externalized harms).180 
But the Supreme Court is not stocked with ill-equipped thinkers. 
We may presume that whatever the implications, the justices who 
forged the Nollan and Dolan rules saw them as the best means to 
their selected end. If it was not to enhance the utility of landowners, 
then the Court's support for the nexus and proportionality regime 
must stem from a conviction that unconstrained bargaining-even in 
the comparatively tame context oftoday's "conditional use permits"-
is an unsuitable means of conducting good land use planning, pre-
sumably because it provides inadequate safeguards against state ab-
dication and exploitation abuses. 
177. Fenell, supra note 40, at 4-5. 
178. See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 2, at 167 (describing downzoning techniques by 
which "undeveloped property is initially heavily restricted with the clear intention of 
rezoning the property in response to specific development proposals."). 
179. See Fennell, supra note 40, at 50. 
180. ld. at 7-8. 
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The concern is certainly not unfounded. For example, although 
Professor Kayden argues that there is no constitutional basis to pre-
vent unrelated amenity bargaining, he nevertheless worries that al-
lowing it may still prove unsound public policy.1B1 He warns that the 
danger of unconstrained bargaining in the land use context is that it 
sanctions municipal bribery, enabling "zoning for sale," and may cor-
rupt healthy planning processes. 182 Although unrelated amenity 
trades may make a given landowner and bureaucrat feel better off, 
they create systemic problems for the community in terms of assur-
ing that the larger public interest is truly served: 
The constitutional acceptance of incentive zoning for unrelated 
amenities should not obscure the technique's potential short-
comings and the resulting importance of policy guidelines. 
Questions of who gains and who loses demand explicit and rig-
orous examination, especially as the disconnection between an 
incentive's burden and an amenity's benefit increases. In order 
to make informed judgments about whether to support or op-
pose the tradeoff between congestion here and low-income hous-
ing there, citizens need full disclosure about the nature of the 
bargain. 
Furthermore, incentive zoning, no less than land policy at 
all levels of government, should strive toward ideals of fairness 
and equity in its administration. Incentive zoning's burdens and 
benefits should be evenly distributed throughout a city in accor-
dance with zoning's bedrock principle of according equal and 
uniform treatment to similarly situated landowners. No single 
area should bear a disproportionate share of bonus floor area, 
nor enjoy a disproportionate share of amenities.183 
(In lay terms, the low-income residents already living next to where 
the factory gets built may not be so excited about the municipal bar-
gain that allowed it in exchange for new low-income housing con-
structed elsewhere.) Kayden's concerns recall the conclusion of 
Daniel Pollak that the new rules may contribute a positive "rationali-
zation" of the land use decisionmaking toward what he suggests are 
"simply good planning practices."184 
Due Process in Municipal Bargaining. If rendered in the lan-
guage of equal protection, Kayden's essential concern, impliedly 
shared by Pollak, is about due process. The problem with unfettered 
181. See Kayden, supra note 58, at 41-44. 
182. Id. at 7. 
183. ld. at 49-50. 
184. PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 75, 34. 
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bargaining in land uses is that the excessive reliance on particular-
ized decisionmaking prevents application of the procedural safe-
guards that normally constrain arbitrary action by state actors. 
Zoning laws typically require notice and a hearing before a decision is 
made, but they do not require impartiality of decision makers, and 
judicial review of zoning decisions applies the minimal scrutiny gen-
erally afforded legislative decisions. 
Although the decisions of a zoning board are traditionally consid-
ered legislative in nature, some states have adopted the position that 
the small scale of local zoning authority prevents the deliberation 
and logrolling that typically constrain arbitrary decision by larger 
legislative bodies, and that zoning decisions should be treated as judi-
cial phenomena.185 Professor Cordes describes how the special na-
ture of zoning boards renders them immune from the safeguards of 
"legislative due process": 
[An important] reason for more closely scrutinizing rezoning de-
cisions concerns the nature of local legislative bodies them-
selves. The normal deference to legislative decisionmaking 
processes is premised on a model of government in which undue 
influence in decisionmaking is mitigated by the inability of any 
one interest group to dominate. This model, based on national 
and state legislatures, envisions logrolling and coalition build-
ing as a necessary part of the legislative process. Further, this 
necessarily involves a protracted process resulting in the forced 
deliberation of issues; benefits insured in other contexts by trial-
like procedures. These features of legislative action are often 
viewed as a type of 'legislative due process.' 
Commentators have frequently noted that local governing 
bodies often lack these features. They are frequently smaller in 
size and of a more homogenous character and thus are not 
forced to pursue the more compromising and deliberative pro-
cess indicative of 'higher' legislative bodies. This makes them 
more susceptible to the undue influence of personal conflicts 
185. See Cordes, supra note 2, at 190-95. Cordes writes: "Although a majority of 
jurisdictions still regard rezoning decisions as legislative, a growing minority of 
states, supported by substantial academic commentary, now view small-scale rezon-
ings as quasi-judicial and thus subject to basic due process requirements. The leading 
case reflecting this trend is Fasano v. Washington County, in which the Oregon Su-
preme Court held that the rezoning of 32 acres of land was a quasi-judicial act which 
required, among other things, provision of procedural safeguards such as impartial 
decision makers. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized the limited num-
ber of parties involved, the small size of the affected parcel, and the pre-existing stan-
dards established by the county's comprehensive plan." (Footnotes omitted). Id. at 
190-91. See also Kublicki, supra note 4, at 132-34. 
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since the process itself is less likely to insulate against the taint 
of bias upon the ultimate decision. 186 
Nevertheless, most zoning boards remain unconstrained by the due 
process safeguards that apply to judicial decisions. Can we trust 
them to render ad hoc particularized decisions in the public interest? 
And like Alice, it seems that we are back to where we started, at 
the edge of a cavernous rabbit hole. The critiques of the bargaining 
model are compelling, and yet they provide no further elucidation 
about how to strike the appropriate balance between public and pri-
vate interests in land use, and the bargaining model arose as a re-
sponse to that uncertainty. So, perhaps rather than just eviscerating 
bargaining ala nexus and proportionality, which gives rise to ineffi-
ciencies and insoluble cumulative impacts problems, perhaps the bet-
ter approach is to work harder to fix bargaining. 
VII. REPAIRING THE BARGAINING MoDEL: TowARD A 
THEORY OF REPRESENTATION 
Building a better bargaining model means creating a system that 
enables value-creating exchanges that benefit all. The trick is figur-
ing out how to make sure that "all" are truly benefiting. 
Protecting the private parties of immediate interest is crucial, 
but this seems manageable in a bargaining regime primarily because 
they are present at the table. Nevertheless, it is important to con-
strain the bargaining environment such that municipalities do not 
unreasonably establish the initial allocation of rights in favor of the 
public interest. For example, abusive deployment of downzoning, by 
which "undeveloped property is initially heavily restricted with the 
clear intention of rezoning the property in response to specific devel-
opment proposals,"187 must be curtailed. (Ironically, nexus and pro-
portionality would appear to steer municipalities even closer toward 
this practice; Pollak recommends similar practices to municipalities 
with still undeveloped land. 188) 
However, controlling the initial allocation represents a more 
traditional bargaining problem: that of the legislative process. On is-
sues of comprehensive planning, as opposed to individual permit ne-
gotiations, we should be able to trust the democratic process because 
bargaining at that level of scale should involve a sufficiently public 
clash of competing values as to force a deliberative procession toward 
186. Cordes, supra note 2, at 195. 
187. ld. at 167. 
188. PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 90-91. 
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the correct balance. And where a landowner party to municipal bar-
gaining feels they are beginning with the wrong initial allocation, 
then her beef is not with bargaining in the individual case but with 
the electoral process that yielded the comprehensive plan. (Her ulti-
mate BATNA: exit. Houston awaits.) 
The more challenging problem is how to get the negotiation to 
recognize the "all" implied by the public interests in a given land use 
conflict. Most of them will not be present at the table. 
In some respects, the problems confronting zoning decisionmak-
ing are similar to the problems implicated by negotiated rulemaking 
in administrative agencies, a context in which state actors are 
charged to render publicly significant outcomes through a bargaining 
process. As compared to a zoning dispute, the issues treated in nego-
tiated rulemaking command enormously greater stakes, impacting 
vastly more parties than are present at the bargaining table. If we 
trust negotiated decisionmaking in that context, who could question 
it in the context of a local zoning dispute? However, the bedrock of 
negotiated rulemaking legitimacy is its excessive attention to the ad-
equacy of representation at the table. Great pains are taken that all 
potentially interested parties are represented at the negotiating ta-
ble, and if it is feared that the assembled group does not fairly re-
present the interested public, negotiation will not proceed.1B9 
Perhaps a bargaining-model of zoning could stand to learn from 
negotiated rulemaking in its strict attention to representation. Mter 
all, in the absence of the safeguards associated with judicial and 
larger-scale legislative processes-and in the absence of rigid bar-
gaining constraints like nexus and proportionality-the only guaran-
tor that the true public interest be served is in representation. 
Conceding the real (and at times irreconcilable) tensions between the 
competing private and public values at stake in land use disputes, 
perhaps what can save the bargaining model of zoning decisionmak-
ing is a better theory of representation. 
Scholars of public dispute resolution offer some helpful starting 
points for the inquiry. 
As discussed above, Professor Rose proposes mediation as the 
best theoretical model for legitimizing local land use planning deci-
sionmaking, and offers concepts of "exit" and "voice" as means of pro-
viding necessary representational constraints.190 She argues that in 
189. See oral communication with Susskind, supra note 71; cf. Freeman & 
Langbein, supra note 100, at 73-75, 83 (describing the inclusive participation proto-
cols for negotiated rulemaking). 
190. Rose, supra note 62, at 890-92. 
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local arenas, where constraints founded on separation-of-powers con-
cepts are ill-fitted to the scale of operations, legitimacy can be har-
vested through mediative processes that ensure meaningful 
participation (voice) for interested parties and recognize the parties' 
ultimate BATNA-that of leaving the bargaining table (exit). But as 
compelling as is her recognition that unconstrained land use bargain-
ing may best be harnessed as mediation, Rose's proposition that voice 
and exit can salvage and legitimate the bargaining model is unper-
suasive in most contexts. In other than very small communities, 
voice is difficult to ensure (absent the still-missing theory of repre-
sentation), and in most localities-especially small communities-
exit is an unlikely, and accordingly hollow threat. 
Professor Menkel-Meadow has also considered the question of 
how deliberative democratic processes can take account of represen-
tation issues in public problem-solving contexts where negotiation-
based processes are relied on in the absence of a shared substantive 
concept of the good. 191 Turning to Jurgen Habermas's political the-
ory for inspiration, she proposes as a governing procedural model the 
"discourse principle," according to which outcomes are legitimate "if 
and only if all possibly affected persons could agree to them as par-
ticipants in rational discourse."192 Menkel-Meadow adopts the dis-
course principle subject to the additional substantive requirement 
that inequality of power and resources not distort decisionmaking or 
coerce deliberation.l93 She recognizes, however, the problem of how 
this theory can take account of representation in contexts where indi-
vidual participation is impossible: 
[T]o the extent that participation remains a cornerstone of dem-
ocratic theory, new forms of participation (whether direct or me-
diated by agents or representatives) may require the creation of 
new institutions or modifications of old forms to permit opti-
mum and appropriate levels of participation for effective and le-
gitimate outcomes.194 
(Unfortunately, this in-progress piece stops short of proposing a 
solution.) 
The literature reveals few novel proposals for managing the ten-
sions of land use bargaining with reference to the representation 
problem, but two proposals falling at either end of the legalistic/mar-
ket-model spectrum of decisionmaking bear mentioning. At the free 
191. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 63, at 9. 
192. Id. at 11. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 9. 
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market end, Professor Fennel proposes that private and public inter-
ests could be protected in a bargaining framework by the adaptation 
of a liability-based in-kind call option, which would allow landowners 
free disposition of their property so long as they effectively remedy 
harms to identified public values. Her proposal is not specifically ori-
ented toward solving the representation problem, but offers protec-
tion for interested parties through the market method of veto-
purchasing: 
The centerpiece of [the proposed] approach is a mechanism that 
amounts to an in-kind 'call option'-a species of liability rule 
that would permit landowners to engage in otherwise forbidden 
land uses by providing in-kind remediation of cognizable nega-
tive externalities. Although the idea of using liability rules to 
regulate land use is not new, my approach differs from the stan-
dard liability rules in that it focuses on the in-kind remediation 
of externalities rather than the payment of monetary damages. 
This in-kind call option would place a ceiling on the permissible 
bargaining range while leaving landowners and governmental 
entities free to pursue more efficient alternatives without re-
gard to the Nollan/ Dolan limitations. The call option would it-
self be alienable as well, allowing communities to effectively buy 
veto rights with respect to development on a given parcel of 
land. This framework would provide a coherent mechanism for 
blocking unconstitutional takings without also blocking socially 
beneficial bargains.195 
Fennell's model deals well with the problem of government over-
reaching and exploitation oflandowners, but neglects the problems of 
zoning authority capture by interest groups and abdication of govern-
mental responsibility. Additionally, although the market framework 
provides an attractively predictable model of stakeholder behavior, it 
weakens protections for Kayden's marginalized community members 
that may have difficulty protecting interests easily compromised in 
the bargaining process (especially in the realm of raising "cognizable" 
objections to a proposed use and its corresponding remedy). Needless 
to say, marginalized groups are unlikely to be able to purchase veto-
entitlements. Finally, in promoting the market sale of entitlements, 
Fennell's proposal risks steering development of the bargaining pro-
cess away from the more promising consensus-based mediation 
model advocated by Professor Rose. 
At the other end of the spectrum is a proposal by a pair of New 
Jersey judges that localities enact "fairness hearings" at which a 
195. Fennell, supra note 40, at 7-8. 
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judge can assess a proposed settlement's reasonableness and fairness 
to all interested parties.196 They observe that such hearings have 
been advocated in various "public law" contexts due to the salutary 
effect that neutral review provides for the interests of absent third 
parties.197 According to this proposal, 
A fairness hearing would be similar to the public hearings held 
prior to board action. The applicant and/or municipal agency 
involved could explain the settlement and the basis for its sup-
port. Members of the public could comment for or against the 
settlement. [It is] essential that members of the public be given 
notice and an opportunity to be heard. A fairness hearing, af-
fording limited intervention to present arguments or to appeal 
an approved settlement, seeks to balance competing concerns. 
Intervention is permitted, but only to determine the settle-
ment's fairness, not to allow the intervener to compel a full adju-
dication of the case's merits.198 
The fairness hearing appropriately attends to the problem of absent 
third parties, but it presumes an adversarial nature in the settlement 
context that may not accurately characterize the relationships at 
play in the bargaining model except in the most controversial con-
texts. Although this model would work well where a proposed settle-
ment is notorious within a community, it may require more 
participation from interested third parties than is realistic, especially 
when bargaining has proceeded smoothly. Most problematically, this 
judicially-modeled proposal presumes that a judge hearing only a 
fraction of the exchange that gave rise to a negotiated outcome can 
adequately represent the interests of absent parties that he or she 
may know little about. A significant value of the mediation model of 
bargaining is that parties present over the course of the negotiation 
experience "learning" benefits that enable them to better understand 
the conflicting interests and values at play.199 
But rather than entrusting the representation of absent third 
parties' interests to a purposefully shielded authority figure for vindi-
cation after the negotiation process is over, perhaps the better solu-
tion is to entrust their representation to a designated member of the 
negotiating team distinct from the rest of the zoning board. 
This person could be deputized with the special obligation of rep-
resenting the interests of vulnerable absentee parties as distinct from 
196. Cohen et al., supra note 17, at 864-65. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Cf. Freeman & Langbein, supra note 100, at 80-81. 
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the rest of the zoning board, which is charged with the representation 
of the general public interest. This third-party deputy would acquire 
sufficient knowledge of the absent parties' needs and interests as to 
make them part of the negotiation, such that the primary parties can 
be confronted with them during the "learning" phases of the process. 
(Ideally, where possible, the deputy could also convey the learning 
benefits she gains through the negotiation to the interested third par-
ties.) Furthermore, if adequately insulated from the zoning board (in 
the style of an ombudsman), the third-party deputy could maintain 
vigilance against capture, or even exploitation of present party land-
owners based on the regulatory expertise she would develop in her 
professional role. 
The involvement of a third-party deputy might enable the devel-
opment of a zoning mediation process that could approach the utility 
of Susskind's negotiated rulemaking model, where the public interest 
is successfully pursued through learning-based consensus.2oo Ulti-
mately, a third-party deputy would also be subject to capture-poten-
tially, and perhaps most disarmingly, by the zoning board itself. The 
same representation critiques that apply in other arenas would likely 
apply in this one, since a proxy can never seamlessly translate an-
other individual's preferences, nor fully convey procedural learning 
benefits to the principal. But representational flaws associated with 
the deputy are no more daunting than the flaws associated with the 
status quo and they are arguably less so. Until Professor Menkel-
Meadow delivers a welcome (!) theory of representation in delibera-
tive democracy, perhaps this is the best means of preserving the bar-
gaining model dominant in land use planning while protecting the 
public interests most likely to be sacrificed therein. 
VIII. CoNCLUSION 
This article has sought to demonstrate how modern land use 
planning is fundamentally an exercise in bargaining, and how recent 
movements in the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence would dis-
mantle that system. It concludes that while there is merit to the 
Court's concerns about impermissible bargaining, the constraints it 
has crafted through nexus and proportionality are ill wed to the ac-
tual nature of the process it seeks to govern. Nexus and proportional-
ity provide helpful indications of good planning decisions in many 
cases, but may needlessly prevent beneficial solutions to real 
200. See id. at 110-13 (discussing the learning and consensus benefits of negoti-
ated rulemaking); oral communication with Susskind, supra note 71. 
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problems in land use planning for which the doctrines fail to provide 
even the possibility of solution, such as the cumulative impacts 
problem. 
Nevertheless, unfettered bargaining poses real risks that out-
comes will fail to vindicate the correct balance between public and 
private interests in land use within communities. But the real prob-
lem may lie in the impossibility of reaching consensus on where that 
balance should rest. Until that occurs, procedural protection for all 
parties in the form of adequate representation is the best remedy. 
One means of accomplishing this may be the appointment of a third-
party deputy to represent absent third parties in a mediation-ori-
ented bargaining process. 
